[Mb-civic] Why Iraq Is Still Worth the Effort - Fareed Zakaria - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

Why Iraq Is Still Worth the Effort
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By Fareed Zakaria
The Washington Post
Wednesday, March 22, 2006; A21

Three years ago this week, I watched the invasion of Iraq 
apprehensively. I had supported military intervention to rid the country 
of Saddam Hussein's tyranny, but I had also been appalled by the crude 
and unilateral manner in which the Bush administration handled the 
issue. In the first weeks after the invasion, I was critical of several 
of the administration's decisions -- crucially, invading with a light 
force and dismantling the governing structures of Iraq (including the 
bureaucracy and army). My criticisms grew over the first 18 months of 
the invasion, a period that offered a depressing display of American 
weakness and incompetence. And yet, for all my misgivings about the way 
the administration has handled this policy, I've never been able to join 
the antiwar crowd. Nor am I convinced that Iraq is a hopeless cause that 
should be abandoned.

Let's remember that in 2002 and early 2003, U.S. policy toward Iraq was 
collapsing. The sanctions regime was becoming ineffective against Saddam 
Hussein -- he had gotten quite good at cheating and smuggling -- and it 
was simultaneously impoverishing the Iraqi people. Regular 
reconnaissance and bombing missions over Iraq were done through "no-fly" 
zones, which required a large U.S. and British presence in Saudi Arabia 
and Turkey. These circumstances were fueling a poisonous 
anti-Americanism in the Muslim world.

In his fatwa of 1998, Osama bin Laden's first two charges against the 
United States were that it was "occupying" Saudi Arabia and starving 
Iraqi women and children. The Palestinian cause was a distant third. 
Meanwhile, Hussein had a 30-year history of attempting to build nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons.

The other reality by 2003 was that the United States and the 
international community had developed a reasonably effective process for 
military interventions like Iraq. The Rand Corp. released a thorough 
study just before the invasion pointing out that the central lesson of 
the 1990s was that if you went in with few troops (Haiti, Somalia), 
chaos prevailed, but if you went in with robust forces (Bosnia, Kosovo, 
East Timor), it was possible to succeed.

Consider what the administration did in Afghanistan. It allied with 
local forces on the ground so that order would be maintained. It upheld 
the traditional structure of power and governance in the country -- that 
is, it accepted the reality of the warlords while working slowly and 
quietly to weaken them. To deflect anti-Americanism, the military turned 
over the political process to the United Nations right after Kabul fell. 
(Most people forget that it was the United Nations that created the 
assembly that picked Hamid Karzai as president.) The United States gave 
NATO and the European Union starring roles in the country -- and real 
power -- which led them to accept real burden-sharing. The European 
Union actually spends more in Afghanistan than the United States does.

But Iraq turned out to be a playground for all kinds of ideological 
theories that the Bush administration had about the Middle East, 
democracy, the United Nations and the Clinton administration. It also 
became a playground for a series of all-consuming turf wars and policy 
battles between various departments and policymakers in the 
administration. A good part of the chaos and confusion in Washington has 
abated, but the chaos in Iraq has proved much harder to reverse. It is 
far easier to undo a long-standing social and political order than it is 
to put it back together again.

So why have I not given up hope? Partly it's because I have been to 
Iraq, met the people who are engaged in the struggle to build their 
country and cannot bring myself to abandon them. Iraq has no Nelson 
Mandelas, but many of its leaders have shown remarkable patience, 
courage and statesmanship. Consider the wisdom and authority of Grand 
Ayatollah Ali Sistani, or the fair-minded and effective role of the 
Kurds, or the persistent pleas for secularism and tolerance from men 
such as Ayad Allawi. You see lots of rough politics and jockeying for 
power in Baghdad. But when the stakes get high, when the violence 
escalates, when facing the abyss, you also see glimpses of leadership.

There is no doubt that the costs of the invasion have far outweighed the 
benefits. But in the long view of history, will that always be true? If, 
after all this chaos, a new and different kind of Iraqi politics 
emerges, it will make a difference in the region. Even now, amid the 
violence, one can see that. The old order in Iraq was built on fear and 
terror. One group dominated the land, oppressing the others. Now 
representatives of all three communities -- Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds -- 
are sitting down at the table, trying to construct a workable bargain 
they can all live with.

These sectarian power struggles can get extremely messy, and violent 
parties have taken advantage of every crack and cleavage. But this may 
be inevitable in a country coming to terms with very real divisions and 
disagreements. Iraq may be stumbling toward nation-building by consent, 
not brutality. And that is a model for the Middle East.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/21/AR2006032101152.html?nav=hcmodule
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