[Mb-civic] FW: POINT OF VIEW - Iran: The French Angle

Thu Mar 2 12:05:48 PST 2006

------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 2006 23:50:58 -0500
Subject: POINT OF VIEW - Iran: The French Angle

 StratFor

 Iran: The French Angle

 Feb 16, 2006

 Summary

 In an uncharacteristic bout of bluntness, France has flatly labeled the
Iranian nuclear program military in nature and in need of being stopped by
the international community. The change of policy is about more than giving
in to the obvious, it is about once again repositioning France as a major
international player.

 Analysis

 French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy on Feb. 16 said, "No civilian
nuclear program can explain the Iranian nuclear program. It is a clandestine
military nuclear program. The international community has sent a very firm
message in telling the Iranians to return to reason and suspend all nuclear
activity and the enrichment and conversion of uranium, but they aren't
listening to us. Now it's up to the [U.N.] Security Council to say what it
will do, what means it will use to stop, to manage, to halt this terrible
crisis of nuclear proliferation caused by Iran."

 Long describing itself as the Muslim world's best friend in the West, long
an opponent of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and long desirous of
access to Iran's petroleum resources, France is making an about-face in
foreign policy with Douste-Blazy's statement.

 But as with so many things, the announcement is not really about Iran at
all -- it is about France. French President Jacques Chirac's rationale for
being involved in nuclear negotiations with Iran was never about Iran's
nuclear program per se. Instead it was a stopgap measure to find a new
vector for French foreign diplomacy.

 The core of France's de Gaullist geopolitical perception of itself, to
which Chirac subscribes, is that France holds insufficient power by itself
to affect global affairs to its satisfaction, so it must work to expand and
deepen the European Union in order to build a platform from which Paris can
project power. The fault in that plan is that Paris assumed that all of the
European members of this French platform were willing supporters of French
policy -- or at least sufficiently pliable to not cause too many problems.

 The Iraq war blew that theory to pieces. France, in league with Germany and
Russia, assumed that it was speaking for "Europe" when it opposed the United
States' Middle East policies. To their surprise the French found a coalition
of states including Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Romania leaving their "ranks" and diplomatically siding with
the United States. The Iraq war was the death knell for 50 years of French
diplomatic efforts, and left Paris groping for a replacement strategy.

 In the end Paris decided that it would take the lessons of its defeat to
heart, and compose a new grouping that met three criteria. First, it had to
be composed of countries powerful enough to be taken seriously. Second, it
had to be small enough to be manageable. And third, it had to be inclusive
of countries able to sabotage any strategy adopted from the outside, while
exclusive of countries that France's European partners reflexively
distrusted.

 That last requirement necessitated both the exclusion of Russia and the
inclusion of the United Kingdom. Russia's participation in France's
anti-Iraq efforts guaranteed the opposition of the entire swathe of Central
European states that until recently had been Russian satellites, and
bringing in the British ensured that the United States would not go out of
its way to sabotage French efforts. Chirac invited France's longtime ally,
Germany, along for the ride, and the "EU-3" was born.

 After a quick flirtation with Syria, the test case for the new style of
diplomacy was Iran, and herein lay the seeds of destruction for France's new
attempt to bolster its international stature: France did not care a whit
about Iran. The EU-3's engagement was not really an attempt to solve the
nuclear imbroglio. For France, it was about proving that Paris mattered on
the world stage. For Germany, it was about getting contracts for work in
Iran. For the United Kingdom, it was about keeping the United States in the
loop. Even Iran was not particularly interested in talking about nuclear
issues, but instead wanted to use its program as a card to play in ongoing
negotiations with the United States over Iraq. Chirac's concern with
France's status and image gave the Iranians the leverage to do just that.

 The fiction nonetheless lasted until unrelated events tore France's
attention away. In May 2005 a series of massive domestic miscalculations by
Chirac contributed to the defeat of the EU constitution in a French
referendum. Suddenly, the bedrock of France's entire economic and political
strategy was in danger. Iran took a backseat.

 But the deathblow to the strategy did not really come until the defeat of
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Chirac's long-time ally, in September
2005 elections. Schroeder's replacement is the far more pro-U.S. Angela
Merkel, a woman whose delicate government translates into far less tolerance
for mushy policy on the international scene. Her relative friendliness with
Washington and her directness with the Iranians quickly resulted in Iranian
figures labeling her a "Zionist" and a "Hitlerite" -- a mix that indicates
Iranian propaganda personnel are in dire need of a content editor.

 Chirac quickly realized that both of its EU-3 partners were moving quickly
away from the plodding, nonproductive negotiations of the past three years
and toward a policy that would be more in step with the United States.
Merkel and Blair quickly agreed to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council,
leaving France in the awkward position of mumbling assent. For a country
that prides itself on being at the forefront of all things, this was
unacceptable. Yet the dissolution of France's latest diplomatic experiment
obviously would have been at hand if Paris were to disagree with its
partners.

 And so France not only seized the initiative, it did so in the most
provocative way it could. On Jan. 19, Chirac warned that any state that
thought it could launch or contribute to a terrorist attack against France
could face nuclear retribution from his country's 300-strong nuclear
arsenal. And on Feb. 16, Douste-Blazy flatly described Iran's nuclear
program as "clandestine" and "military" in nature.

 Again, remember, this is not about Iran. Chirac could not care less what
ultimately happens to Iran's nuclear program or even Iran itself. This is
about France taking back the initiative and saving face, something Chirac
has achieved with aplomb. For now the French have outflanked not just Blair
or Merkel, but to a degree even the Americans. Suddenly Chirac is center
stage again, and in a position to move to the forefront of a forming
American-Anglo-European policy.

 For a president who has suffered defeat after defeat of late -- at home, in
Europe and further abroad -- that is not bad at all.

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