[Mb-civic] A Plan for Nuclear Waste - John Deutch & Ernest Moniz - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

A Plan for Nuclear Waste

By John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz

U.S. policy for managing radioactive spent fuel from commercial nuclear 
reactors was largely set by the decisions of Presidents Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter 30 years ago. They decided to forgo spent-fuel 
reprocessing, a technology developed for separating high-purity 
plutonium for nuclear weapons. Their decision was based on the cost of 
reprocessing and on the proliferation risks that would be posed by large 
quantities of separated plutonium in civilian nuclear power programs 
across the globe.

This decision committed the United States to direct disposal of 
irradiated fuel in a geological repository for long-term isolation from 
the biosphere. Yucca Mountain in Nevada -- adjacent to the nuclear 
weapons test site -- was subsequently chosen by Congress for development 
as a repository. Because the spent fuel contains significant amounts of 
plutonium, and because management of spent nuclear fuel requires a very 
long time commitment, Congress decided that the government would take 
ownership of the irradiated fuel and assume responsibility for its 
transportation and long-term care.

Now, after decades of expensive false starts, and with an uncertain 
future for Yucca Mountain, Congress and the Bush administration, as 
reported last week in The Post, are indicating that they might abruptly 
change course. Such a change, despite good intentions, could further 
complicate disposal of radioactive waste and heighten rather than reduce 
public concerns about expanded nuclear power.

We agree that a policy change is called for. Why? First, the rising cost 
of natural gas and growing concern about global warming have rekindled 
interest in nuclear power. A prudent response to global warming should 
include new nuclear plants, based on evolution of current designs to 
incorporate enhanced safety and streamlined construction, if they have 
lower construction costs than was the case historically. But significant 
expansion of nuclear power, together with extension of licenses for 
current plants, will yield more spent fuel than Yucca Mountain can 
handle, even if the statutory limits on its capacity are doubled. This 
will eventually put before Congress one of its least popular chores: 
finding a site for another nuclear waste repository.

Second, it is unclear whether Yucca Mountain will ever receive a license 
from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. After billions of dollars of 
development and study, the site has been found to have considerably more 
water than anticipated, and federal courts have ruled that the 
10,000-year licensing standard for radiation leakage lacks 
justification. Yucca Mountain is not dead, but on its current path, it 
is close to it.

Third, because of schedule slippage at Yucca, the federal government 
failed in its statutory obligation to begin accepting spent fuel from 
reactor sites in 1998. This has resulted in ongoing litigation, with 
possibly substantial financial penalties to be levied on the government 
and substantial uncertainty for new plant licensing and construction.

Fourth, a new era of global nuclear fuel cycle expansion poses 
proliferation risks. Iran, which is suspected of using nuclear power 
development to disguise a weapons program, may be a harbinger of more 
such confrontations. Urgent concrete action is needed to build on the 
recent administration initiative to improve the security of the global 
nuclear fuel supply.

What is certain is that a decision by the United States to recycle 
plutonium would upset these efforts. The link between management of 
spent fuel and the risk of proliferation is clear. If long-lived 
elements such as plutonium go with the spent fuel to a geological 
repository, they produce the long-term heating that will be, over many 
millennia, a threat to the integrity of the repository. If they are 
removed from the spent fuel by reprocessing, a proliferation risk is 
created.

What should be done? First, and most important, the government should 
take title to the spent fuel stored at commercial reactor sites across 
the country and consolidate it at one or more federal sites until a 
proper disposal pathway is created. This can be done safely and securely 
for an extended period and, indeed, such extended storage should be 
incorporated into a proper disposal strategy. It would take the pressure 
for a hasty disposal solution off both government and industry.

Second, the president should continue his broad diplomatic effort for 
supplier countries such as France, Britain, Russia and the United States 
to supply fresh fuel (and remove spent fuel) for countries with small 
nuclear power programs if they agree to forgo dangerous and costly fuel 
cycle facilities for a significant period.

Third, Yucca Mountain should not be abandoned. Rather, the Energy 
Department should take a fresh look at assessing its suitability under 
various conditions and adjust the project schedule accordingly.

Fourth, the administration is right to consider reestablishing a strong 
program to explore ideas for reducing the challenges of long-term waste 
management while not increasing proliferation risks. But much research 
is needed, and it will take decades before the viability of such 
approaches can be evaluated, and still more time before they can be 
deployed. Premature technology choices and arbitrary schedules for 
demonstration plants will repeat past mistakes.

Fifth, Congress and the administration should not push for reprocessing 
of the current spent-fuel inventory. Marginal benefits for disposal are 
more than offset by cost; by risks to the environment, health and 
safety; and by the proliferation threat. This last problem, by itself, 
would undoubtedly provoke considerable opposition in Congress and could 
undermine the reconsideration of nuclear power that is now gaining momentum.

A successful waste-disposal program has to survive many administrations; 
a program based on reprocessing will not.

John Deutch served as director of central intelligence in the Clinton 
administration and undersecretary of energy in the Carter 
administration. Ernest J. Moniz was undersecretary of energy in the 
Clinton administration. They are professors at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/29/AR2006012900719.html
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