[Mb-civic] To Tame Tehran - Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani -
Washington Post Op-Ed
William Swiggard
swiggard at comcast.net
Sat Jan 28 05:30:03 PST 2006
To Tame Tehran
By Michael McFaul and Abbas Milani
Saturday, January 28, 2006; A21
In response to Tehran's foolish decision to restart its nuclear
enrichment program, the U.N. Security Council finally got serious about
dealing with the Iranian threat. If Tehran does not accept Moscow's
offer to enrich uranium for Iran on Russian soil, a U.N. censure of Iran
seems likely. Anything less will affirm the assessment of hard-liners in
Tehran that the United States is too weak to achieve its basic foreign
policy objectives regarding Iran.
But then what? Passing a Security Council resolution is a necessary but
far from sufficient step for addressing the threat from the Islamic
republic. New sanctions, even if they included oil, would not undermine
the Iranian regime. A more farsighted, comprehensive strategy for
reducing the Iranian menace to international security must include the
development of an alliance with those inside Iran who also see the
dangers of the regime's adventurism. Ironically, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and his dangerous foreign policy initiatives abroad,
combined with his bankrupt and increasingly oppressive policies at home,
have helped create favorable conditions for forging such an alliance.
On the surface, the regime in Tehran seems to stand together in
supporting Iran's more confrontational foreign policy stances. Behind
the scenes, however, a fierce struggle is underway. In one camp is
Ahmadinejad, his supporters in the Revolutionary Guards and the
paramilitary force known as the Basijis, and messianic fundamentalists
inspired by the teachings of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi. In the other camp
is not only Iran's embattled democratic movement but also an array of
forces that benefited from the status quo before Ahmadinejad came to
power, including the head of the Expediency Council: Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani.
Unexpectedly, Ahmadinejad has pushed hard to remove from power many
experienced high- and mid-level government officials, including those
previously handling the nuclear negotiations, and to replace them with
unqualified loyalists from the security services and the Basijis. Not
surprisingly, these fired professionals have quietly begun to regroup to
push back, and, significantly, their efforts have not been checked by
the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Until recently Khamenei had
backed Ahmadinejad as a way to restrain the powers of Rafsanjani, but
now Khamenei is gently seeking ways to rein in the new president and
those spiritual zealots close to him, such as Mesbah-Yazdi, who threaten
the supreme leader's authority.
If this split in the regime deepens, Ahmadinejad will not be able to
rely on widespread support in Iranian society. In last year's
presidential election, Ahmadinejad ran a clever campaign as an outsider
and critic of the status quo. He rallied electoral support not by
promising to remove Israel from the face of the earth but by pledging to
fight corruption and support the poor. In power, however, Ahmadinejad
quickly undermined his anti-corruption credentials by appointing his
relatives to government positions, and then tried to change the subject
by launching repressive policies at home and exacerbating tensions
abroad. Economic woes, new restrictions on social freedoms and
disappointed expectations mean that popular support for his Khomeini
renaissance is shallow.
These developments create opportunities for Western leaders well beyond
U.N. votes. First, and most obviously, the United States must take
advantage of the current climate to further isolate and marginalize
Ahmadinejad and his cabal and hold them responsible for the crisis.
Calls for constructive engagement with Iran's president are wrong; such
overtures would only confirm Ahmadinejad's contention that
confrontational policies reap rewards.
Second, U.S. and European leaders must do more to stimulate a serious
discussion in Iranian society about the country's security interests,
and articulate policies and arguments that will strengthen an Iranian
political coalition against nuclear weapons. So far the Tehran regime
has monopolized the discussion. Though disguised in assertions about
Iran's right to nuclear energy, the strategic thinking of the regime has
been quite simple: The United States invaded Iraq because Iraq did not
have nuclear weapons; the United States has not invaded North Korea
because North Korea has nuclear weapons.
The flaws in this logic must be exposed. In a major public address,
President Bush should pledge that the United States will never attack a
nonnuclear Iran, while also underscoring that the Iranian process of
acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities actually increases the likelihood
of military confrontation with the United States. Western leaders should
remind Iranian society that a nuclear Iran would also trigger a nuclear
arms race in the region, as Egypt and Saudi Arabia would move quickly to
develop their own arsenals.
Third, Bush should endorse the idea of creating a regional security
organization in the Middle East, which would include Iran. Like the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe during the Cold War,
this new organization could begin to provide security guarantees between
Middle East states as well as those outside the region. A more secure
Iran would create better conditions for the reemergence of a
pro-Western, peaceful, democratic movement inside the country. The
specter of armed conflict with the United States only helps Ahmadinejad
consolidate his power.
Ahmadinejad's threat to external security and internal freedoms is
bringing forth an opposition coalition that sees more clearly the
dangers of confrontation with the West. A nimble U.S. policy, one that
plots a strategy beyond the next Security Council vote, can help these
forces inside Iran succeed.
The writers are research fellows and co-directors of the Iran Democracy
Project at the Hoover Institution.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/27/AR2006012701206.html
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