[Mb-civic] IMPORTANT: U.S. Policy Seen as Big Loser in Palestinian
Vote - Washington Post
William Swiggard
swiggard at comcast.net
Sat Jan 28 05:14:30 PST 2006
U.S. Policy Seen as Big Loser in Palestinian Vote
By Glenn Kessler
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, January 28, 2006; A16
Standing in a sunny Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, surrounded by his top
foreign policy advisers, President Bush issued a clarion call for
resolving the deadly Israeli-Palestinian conflict: "I call on the
Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror."
This week, Palestinians gave their answer, handing a landslide victory
in national legislative elections to Hamas, which has claimed
responsibility for dozens of suicide bombings and desires the
elimination of Israel. Bush's statement calling for new leaders was
aimed at the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, but in the same
speech he also said it was necessary to thwart Hamas -- formally the
Islamic Resistance Movement -- and other militant groups.
The election outcome signals a dramatic failure in the administration's
strategy for Middle East peace, according to analysts and some U.S.
officials. Since the United States cannot deal with an organization
labeled a terrorist organization by the State Department, Hamas's
victory is likely to curtail U.S. aid, limit official U.S. contacts with
the Palestinian government and stall efforts to create an independent
Palestinian state.
More broadly, Hamas's victory is seen as a setback in the
administration's campaign for greater democracy in the Middle East.
Elections in Iran, Iraq, Egypt and now the Palestinian territories have
resulted in the defeat of secular and moderate parties and the rise of
Islamic parties hostile to U.S. interests.
The administration has long been criticized for being reluctant to get
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; even after Bush's 2002
speech, the policy drifted except for occasional high-profile speeches
and events. But after Arafat's death in late 2004 and the beginning of
the new presidential term, Bush vowed things would be different, saying
he would invest "political capital" in ensuring a Palestinian state
before he leaves office three years from now.
The effort went wrong on three fronts, according to interviews inside
and outside the administration:
· The administration put its hopes on the Palestinian president, Mahmoud
Abbas, and poured hundreds of millions of dollars to fund public works
projects. But it failed to back him when he asked for concrete help,
especially in his dealings with the Israelis.
· The administration was highly attuned to the shifts of Israeli
politics but tone-deaf to the upheaval in Palestinian society. It was so
focused on facilitating Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip that it
did not press Israel to end settlement expansion, release additional
prisoners or take other measures that might have reduced Palestinian
indignation.
· Despite deep Israeli misgivings, the administration late last year
shifted policy and decided Hamas could participate in the elections even
though it had not disarmed its militias, in contrast to rules set for
elections in Afghanistan and Northern Ireland.
To be sure, a large share of the blame for Hamas's victory rests with
Abbas -- widely perceived as weak and indecisive -- and his quarreling
and often corrupt Fatah party. The Palestinian Authority proved
incapable of governing Gaza after the Israeli withdrawal, adding to the
perception of incompetence.
Analysts credit the Bush administration with focusing on building some
governing institutions, such as a well-functioning Finance Ministry that
handles the foreign aid that keeps the Palestinian Authority afloat. But
many experts fault the administration for issuing high-sounding rhetoric
without sustained involvement on the ground.
"There were eloquent speeches and praise for Abbas" but little else,
said Robert Malley, director of the International Crisis Group's Middle
East program, who was on President Bill Clinton's National Security
Council staff. "There was an abstract faith in the idea that if you do
the right thing, you will get a two-state solution."
The administration at the start of last year pledged it would take a
low-key approach that would rely much more on nations in the region to
carry the diplomatic burden. Officials were disdainful of the Clinton
administration's deep involvement in the peace process, which they
believed amounted to micromanaging. But over the course of the year, a
top general was dispatched to help organize Palestinian security forces,
former World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn was recruited to assist
on the Gaza withdrawal and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in
November personally negotiated the opening of a border crossing.
The key to the administration's plan was Abbas, who was elected
president after Arafat's death. Abbas had briefly been prime minister
under Arafat in 2003, after international donors threatened to abandon
Arafat if he did not allow the creation of a strong prime minister.
Abbas quit after a few months, blaming both the United States and Israel
for failing to back him up. Administration officials had said they would
not repeat the mistake when he became president.
But Abbas faced a steep road. The administration was already perceived
in the region as biased toward Israel, in part because Bush backed the
Gaza withdrawal plan with pledges that Israel could keep large
settlements and refuse the return of Palestinians in a final peace deal.
Israel's departure from Gaza was designed to be a unilateral step,
depriving Abbas of a negotiated peace victory he could claim; instead,
Hamas asserted it had driven the Israelis out with its uncompromising
approach.
Abbas cut a deal with Hamas, winning its agreement for a cease-fire in
exchange for allowing it to participate in elections. But Abbas did not
put conditions on its participation, such as giving up its weapons or
even pledging not to attack Israelis -- a problem that did not capture
the administration's attention until it was too late.
Abbas privately convinced U.S. officials that a Fatah victory would be a
blow to Islamic extremism in the region, making the election showdown
more enticing to an administration promoting democracy in the Middle
East. He also pledged to quickly pass a law requiring the dismantling of
militias as soon as the new legislature was elected. The original
argument that he should take action against the militias sooner rather
than later faded.
When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon warned in September that he
would try to block Hamas's participation unless it disbanded its militia
and accepted Israel's right to exist, the administration forced the
Israelis to back off. "Elections are fundamental to the continued
evolution and development of the Palestinian process," Rice said.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/27/AR2006012701562.html?nav=hcmodule
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