[Mb-civic] Hamas steps into a complex landscape - Hussein Agha & Robert Malley - Boston Globe Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

  Hamas steps into a complex landscape

By Hussein Agha and Robert Malley  |  January 24, 2006  |  The Boston Globe

THERE IS more uncertainty than clarity surrounding this week's 
Palestinian elections, though this much is plain: Hamas, the Islamist 
movement designated a terrorist organization by the United States and 
considered a mortal enemy by Israel, will be joining the legislature. 
Its entrance is unlikely to be quiet. Riding an unprecedented wave of 
popularity and having outperformed expectations in recent municipal 
elections, it is on pace to capture a sizable portion of votes and, 
perhaps, find a seat at the Cabinet table.

Hamas's decision to enter the political realm was long in coming but 
hardly a surprise. Like Fatah, the dominant secular nationalist 
organization, Hamas was an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike 
Fatah, its agenda was not one of national liberation through armed 
struggle and diplomacy alone. Its first priority was the Palestinian 
people's social and religious transformation. Violence was not its only 
tool, any more than independence was its sole objective. Of the two 
organizations, paradoxically, it is Fatah that has the more militaristic 
pedigree. And, in the absence of armed struggle, it is Hamas that has a 
political agenda to fall back on.

True, violence came to Hamas, and when it did, it did so brutally. Its 
first targets were soldiers and settlers. Later, it extended its 
operations to suicide attacks against Israeli civilians, justifying them 
as retaliation for the killing of Palestinian civilians; on various 
occasions it offered -- in a proposal Israel dismissed as disingenuous 
-- to stop killing civilians if Israel did the same. Resort to violence 
itself displayed political intuition, as attacks were carefully 
calibrated to the public mood. The Palestinian Authority was failing 
miserably in fulfilling the elemental responsibility of protecting its 
people. Unable to provide security, Hamas aimed for second best: It 
provided revenge.

Even at the height of the armed confrontation, Hamas kept one eye firmly 
focused on the religious, social, and cultural, with domestic legitimacy 
foremost on its mind, as it rallied the faithful in mosques and tended 
to their needs through charitable institutions. Throughout, Hamas's 
leaders trusted in the ultimate payoff. Superior discipline and 
ideological coherence, coupled with the public's inevitable 
disenchantment with Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, would yield 
dividends. Payback time, by all accounts, is now.

Vindicated by the breakdown of the peace process, the expiration of the 
Oslo framework, the outbreak of the intifadah, and Israel's unilateral 
withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas can join a new process without endorsing the 
Palestinian Authority's past policies. Politics also offers a respite 
from a taxing conflict with Israel that had cost the movement most of 
its historic leadership. Besides, the Islamists' popularity had reached 
unmatched heights: Fatah was divided and in disarray; the withdrawal 
from Gaza established in the public's mind that the Islamists' violence, 
not the nationalists' negotiations, produces results; and Hamas's 
reputation for integrity and efficiency compares happily to the 
Authority's dismal record.

In the West as in Israel, the prospect of Hamas's rise to power is 
provoking angst and anger, with fears ranging from a political takeover 
to the end of any chance at a diplomatic process. Hamas's past 
performance and present ideological pronouncements certainly give reason 
for pause. But other factors are at play.

Over the past year, Hamas on the whole has adhered to its truce with 
Israel; its elected municipal representatives coordinate with the 
Israeli administration; rather than oppose the principle of future 
negotiations, it disputes the basis of those that were held in the past; 
and, not unlike Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it favors a long-term 
interim agreement between the two parties, albeit on terms far different 
from those Sharon supports.

Furthermore, Hamas may be growing, but there's a limit. A minority of 
Palestinians backs its hard-core Islamist positions and most continue to 
oppose its outlook. Impressive as they are, Hamas's recent gains reflect 
disaffection for the Palestinian Authority more than support for its 
political program, its electoral size considerably inflating its actual 
one. So long as Hamas is not in charge, Palestinians will be grateful 
for every service it provides; once Hamas is in power, Palestinians will 
blame it for every service they lack. Hamas knows all this, and so far 
is operating within these confines. For all their rhetoric, the 
Islamists also are well aware that improving daily life depends on 
relations with Israel and that little can be achieved without the West's 
involvement. Should they take action that fundamentally jeopardizes 
either, Palestinians will suffer and Hamas shoulder the blame.

All the same, Hamas is unlikely to drop its rejection of Israel, its 
military arsenal, or -- if it believes it will enjoy popular backing -- 
its armed operations. The best clue to its future lies in its past: It 
will concentrate on domestic issues, seek to demonstrate that its 
presence can improve daily life, reduce corruption, and tackle 
lawlessness, all the while maintaining its long-term objective of 
transforming society. From the sidelines, whether in or out of 
government, it will criticize the Palestinian Authority's dealings with 
Israel without blocking them and maintain its calls for armed resistance 
without necessarily implementing it. Should it survive Sharon's 
incapacitation, Israel's unilateralism would fit neatly with the 
Islamists' worldview and provide the perfect match: Hamas will attribute 
this achievement to its steadfastness and argue that territorial 
withdrawals do not require ideological compromise. Over time, and 
particularly if the experiment proves successful, Hamas's transition may 
provoke disagreement between the pragmatic and militant wings and, 
eventually, perhaps a split.

With Sharon's stroke, the Israeli political scene has lost a central 
actor. With Hamas's electoral participation, the Palestinian political 
scene is gaining a new one. An already impossibly complex situation is 
about to become more complicated still.

Hussein Agha is a senior associate member of St Antony's College, 
Oxford, and has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian affairs for more 
than 30 years. Robert Malley is the Middle East program director at the 
International Crisis Group and was a special adviser to President Clinton.

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/01/24/hamas_steps_into_a_complex_landscape/
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