[Mb-civic] Focusing on 'Success' In Iraq - Brent Scowcroft -
Washington Post Op-Ed
William Swiggard
swiggard at comcast.net
Mon Jan 16 04:38:03 PST 2006
Focusing on 'Success' In Iraq
By Brent Scowcroft
Monday, January 16, 2006; A17
The December election in Iraq could prove to be a seminal event. The
parliament elected last month will choose a president and prime
minister, providing Iraq its first elected government under a
constitution approved by referendum. This government may well seek, or
at least welcome, changes in the foreign military presence. In addition,
President Bush has made clear that it will need to take increasing
responsibility for rebuilding the country politically and economically,
while Iraqi armed forces take increasing responsibility for defeating
the insurgency.
The election was preceded and accompanied by a bitter and emotional
debate in the United States about the future of the U.S. presence in
Iraq. The coincidence of these events may provide a unique opportunity
to review the role of foreign military forces and the international
community as Iraq takes its next steps back into the community of
nations. Such a review could usefully begin by turning over to the
historians questions about how and why we got into Iraq. Whatever
questions remain, we are there in force, and the central issue that
confronts us is how we move forward most effectively.
The stakes -- for the United States and for the world -- are enormous.
Iraq lies in the center of a region critical to the well-being of the
global system. It is surrounded by states intensely concerned about the
nature and future of that country and its government. A failed Iraq
could be a catastrophe for the Middle East and a calamity for the world.
At the moment such an outcome would be inevitable without the U.S. presence.
There are at least two elements essential to "success" in Iraq. The
first is a central government that meets the needs of the people well
enough to secure their sustained support, shows sufficient consideration
for minority rights to win the loyalty of those minorities and
demonstrates a credible determination to live in peace with its neighbors.
The second is an effective, highly disciplined military and security
establishment that gives its allegiance not to various elements within
Iraqi society but solely to the central government.
The fundamental question for the United States is what kind of policy is
most likely to produce such an outcome and do so at a cost the American
public is prepared to sustain. At the risk of oversimplification, it can
be said that the "answers" proposed in the debate thus far fall into two
broad categories. "Withdrawal" proposals range from immediate pullout to
"setting a date certain." "Success" proposals range from "staying the
course"(not clearly defined, but presumably meaning maintaining
substantial forces in Iraq until the goals there have been achieved) to
increasing the number of troops there.
The first category of proposals places primary emphasis on reducing the
costs -- in blood and treasure -- that the United States is paying in
Iraq. This would be achieved, however, by accepting (or ignoring) the
very real risk that Iraq will not emerge as a viable state and that the
region will descend into chaos. The second category of proposals
underscores how critical it is to achieve "success." But the assumption
is that the American people will continue to be willing to bear the
burdens of Iraq indefinitely.
Both alternatives have unattractive or even unacceptable aspects. The
real challenge is not to choose between them but to make the option that
is most likely to advance the overall U.S. national interest -- the
"success" option -- both more acceptable and more likely, by reducing
its cost and risk. Clearly, progress has already been made, but we
should do everything possible to enhance the prospects for success.
This could be accomplished through several steps designed to eventually
make the foreign presence in Iraq more advisory in nature and more
international in character, in ways resembling the course the United
States has pursued in Afghanistan. The United Nations could be asked to
assume a greater role in providing a more ecumenical political umbrella
and expertise in building and coordinating institutions, programs and
structures. After all, the United Nations played a significant role
after the demise of Saddam Hussein's regime, until a bomb explosion
prompted its exit from the country. The coalition forces are themselves
in Iraq pursuant to a Security Council resolution. And U.N. personnel
figured prominently in managing the recent parliamentary election. A
U.N. presence of such magnitude, however, would require a dedicated
security force, to prevent a repetition of the 2003 tragedy.
Such a force could be contributed by NATO or provided by other
international military units. The new post-election circumstances,
combined with an enhanced U.N. role, could provide a basis for asking
countries such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco and Egypt to
provide enough additional countrywide security and training capabilities
to accelerate the development of a stable, progressive Iraqi state.
(Some Arab states could provide financial support for infrastructure
reconstruction and rehabilitation.) Initially, these forces might be
engaged in missions such as the training of Iraqi troops, infrastructure
protection and holding areas cleared of insurgents. The presence of such
forces might also encourage members of the current coalition to continue
their participation.
As the security situation improved and Iraqi military capability
increased, these international forces could assume more of the
traditional peacekeeping missions they have so effectively carried out
in the past. This could allow the mission of the United States to be
restructured and U.S. troop levels to be reduced.
To be sure, a searching, deliberative debate might disclose still other
possible or more attractive courses of action. But above all, it is time
to focus on our long-term goals in Iraq and on how best to go about
achieving them at a sustainable cost.
The writer was national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and
George H.W. Bush. He is now president of the Forum for International Policy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/15/AR2006011500417.html?nav=hcmodule
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