[Mb-civic] U.S. Cedes Duties in Rebuilding Afghanistan - Washington Post

[William Swiggard]

U.S. Cedes Duties in Rebuilding Afghanistan
NATO, Other Allies Take On New Roles

By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, January 3, 2006; A01

KABUL, Afghanistan -- Four years into a mammoth reconstruction effort 
here that has been largely led, funded and secured by Americans, the 
United States is showing a growing willingness to cede those jobs to others.

The most dramatic example will come by this summer, when the U.S. 
military officially hands over control of the volatile southern region 
-- plagued by persistent attacks from Islamic militias -- to an 
international force led by the NATO alliance. The United States will cut 
its troop strength by 2,500, even though it is not clear how 
aggressively NATO troops will pursue insurgents, who have shown no sign 
of relenting.

At the same time, the U.S. government is increasingly allowing Western 
allies, or Afghans themselves, to take on the tasks of rebuilding a 
country that has suffered more than two decades of fighting and remains 
beset by poverty, drugs and insurgency.

The United States says that its shifting approach complements 
Afghanistan's evolution into a self-sustaining democracy and that 
Washington has no plans to pull out altogether.

"The Afghans have to have enough space to make their own decisions, even 
to stumble sometimes," said U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann. "But we 
shouldn't leave them without critical support before they're strong enough."

As the U.S. presence becomes less visible, however, Afghans are starting 
to question whether the U.S. support is sufficient. Some Afghan 
officials express concern that the Bush administration's priorities are 
simply shifting elsewhere and that the United States may abandon their 
country prematurely, much the way it did in the early 1990s following 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development, which topped 
$1 billion for 2005 and has helped build highways, schools and clinics 
across the country during the last four years, will be reduced to just 
over $600 million in 2006, unless Congress appropriates more money.

On one of the biggest threats facing the country, the illicit drug 
trade, the United States has largely ceded leadership to the British 
government and is pinning its hopes on Afghan provincial governors to 
eradicate poppy fields. Although U.S. officials have warned repeatedly 
about the need to curb the burgeoning opium business, they have so far 
spent only modest amounts to help and now say Kabul must take the 
initiative.

Politically, too, the United States has been less willing to exert its 
influence. The previous ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, played a strong, 
high-profile role here, negotiating directly with recalcitrant regional 
leaders and openly advising President Hamid Karzai. Neumann, who arrived 
several months ago, is a quieter presence who rarely interferes in 
Karzai's decisions.

Earlier last month, to the surprise of many Afghans, the U.S. Embassy 
stood by silently during a struggle for the leadership of the new 
parliament, in which Karzai's government was believed to have backed a 
radical Islamic scholar and ex-militia leader accused of past human 
rights abuses over a more moderate candidate who had run against Karzai 
for president.

Some foreign allies are encouraged by the signs that the United States 
is willing to loosen its grip and allow others a greater role in the 
country's rebirth. Several Afghan officials said they welcomed the 
increased responsibility.

"We don't want to be a permanent burden on the international community," 
said Defense Minister Rahim Wardak. "This country has been defended by 
us for 5,000 years. That is our duty." Still, Wardak noted, the abrupt 
withdrawal of U.S. support after the decade-long Soviet occupation ended 
in 1989 precipitated a civil war that culminated with the Taliban 
movement taking power.

"I hope the international community, and especially the U.S., has 
learned the lesson of what happened," he said. "I hope that history will 
not repeat itself this time."

The transfer of power in southern Afghanistan will provide the first 
critical test of the new U.S. strategy. The shift will allow the Bush 
administration, which has spent more than $47 billion on military 
efforts in Afghanistan since 2001, to cut the U.S. troop presence by 13 
percent, from 19,000 to 16,500.

The move will leave U.S. forces in charge only in the eastern provinces, 
and only until NATO is ready to assume command there as well. That could 
happen later in the year, allowing the United States to reduce its troop 
commitment further.

The reduction, the first since the U.S.-led invasion, comes after a year 
in which nearly 100 American soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, more 
than double the deaths during 2004. Military commanders said the higher 
toll was a result of their more aggressive strategy for battling the 
insurgency. They also asserted there would be a seamless transition when 
NATO troops take over, with help from the Afghan army.

"It's understood that NATO will be in a position to carry on the same 
counterinsurgency fight that we're running today," said Col. Don C. 
McGraw, who directs U.S. military operations here.

But the Afghan army remains in its infancy, and mounting a 
counterinsurgency has not been NATO's job. Questions remain about 
whether it will be willing to take on that task once its troops are 
deployed in the south, where on Monday, a suicide bomber in the city of 
Kandahar attacked a convoy of foreign troops, injuring a U.S. soldier 
and two Afghan civilians.

Until now, NATO has commanded the north and the west, which have been 
less violent than the south and the east. In Kabul, its troops have been 
a familiar and friendly sight on street patrols. In the countryside, 
they have spent much of their time coordinating reconstruction efforts 
-- and none chasing Taliban insurgents.

NATO's rules of engagement will be loosened when it takes over the 
south, allowing its forces to be more aggressive, but it is unclear 
exactly how much more. One member country, the Netherlands, is wavering 
over whether it wants to send troops to the area, a longtime Taliban 
stronghold that has recently been the site of numerous battles and 
suicide bombings. Maj. Andrew Elmes, a British spokesman for the NATO 
force -- officially called the International Security Assistance Force, 
or ISAF -- said he expects its soldiers will primarily serve in a 
peacekeeping function, unlike U.S. troops, who have been initiating 
battles with insurgents.

"If you think of a policeman, who is armed but he doesn't go out looking 
for a fight, that's along the lines we're looking at," he said of the 
expanded ISAF mission, which will add 6,000 soldiers to the 9,000 
currently in the country.

Some knowledgeable Afghans predicted that such a limited NATO role would 
not succeed in the more dangerous territory. "The threat in the south is 
terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime," said Ali Ahmad Jalali, 
who recently resigned as Karzai's interior minister. He spoke by 
telephone from Washington, where he now teaches at the National Defense 
University. "If they don't get involved in fighting those things, what 
will they be providing for the security of the country?"

Another major question is how the transition will affect U.S. efforts to 
track down top fugitives such as al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, his 
deputy Ayman Zawahiri and Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, all of whom are 
believed to be hiding in the region.

NATO has said it will not spend its time hunting individuals. The U.S. 
military will keep only a small residual presence in the south, but 
officials maintain that they will bring in Special Operations troops as 
the need arises.

"If Mullah Omar shows up in Kandahar," McGraw said, "we'll go to Kandahar."

Still, the U.S. willingness to cede authority in the south suggests just 
how remote the possibility of catching notorious fugitives within 
Afghanistan may be. Many security officials here say they believe bin 
Laden and others are across the border in Pakistan, where the United 
States has a much smaller presence.

That likelihood is another reason many Afghans wonder how much longer 
the United States will stay, and whether it is as committed to 
reconstruction as it is to catching terrorists. The possible dramatic 
cuts in USAID funds for Afghanistan -- the result of tightened budgets 
because of heavy U.S. spending in Iraq and domestic hurricane relief -- 
have increased that concern.

Neumann said the $623 million in aid planned for 2006 will not be 
enough, and he is hoping Congress will allocate more through a 
supplemental spending bill, as it has in past years. But he acknowledged 
that getting lawmakers to understand the importance of the U.S. 
commitment here "takes more explanation" than it once did.

Despite considerable reconstruction in the past four years, he said, 
much more needs to be done. Building more roads, he said, would 
strengthen the government, improve security and cut opium production by 
giving farmers access to markets for other products.

"This is too critical to just say we want victory but we want it on the 
cheap," Neumann said. "We're still in a war, and we need to win."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/02/AR2006010201942.html
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