[Mb-civic] NOAM CHOMSKY - Failed States (THIS ONE has the essay!)

Wed Apr 26 13:10:27 PDT 2006

Afterword: Failed States 
Noam Chomsky 

We began by considering four critical issues that should rank high on the
agenda of those concerned with the prospects for a decent future. Two of
them are literally matters of survival: nuclear war and environmental
disaster. The first danger is ever-present, beyond imagination, and in
principle avoidable; practical ways to proceed are understood. The second
is longer-term, and there is much uncertainty about how a serious crisis
can be averted, or at least mitigated, though it is clear enough that the
longer the delay in confronting the tasks, they harder they will be. And
again, sensible measures to proceed are well known. The third major crisis
is that the government of the global superpower is acting in ways that
enhance these threats, and others as well, such as the threat of terrorism
by enemies. That conclusion, unfortunately all too credible, brings to
prominence a fourth critical issue: the growing democratic deficit, the gap
between public will and public policy, a sign of the increasing failure of
formal democratic institutions to function as they would in a democratic
culture with vitality and substance. This last issue is both threatening
and hopeful. It is threatening because it increases the dangers posed by
the first three imminent crises, apart from being intolerable in itself. It
is hopeful because it can be overcome, and again, practical ways to proceed
are well understood, and have often been implemented under far more
difficult circumstances than those faced in the industrial societies today. 

No one familiar with history should be surprised that the growing
democratic deficit at home is accompanied by declaration of messianic
missions to bring democracy to a suffering world. Declarations of noble
intent by systems of power are rarely complete fabrication, and the same is
true in this case. Under some conditions, forms of democracy are
acceptable. Abroad, as the leading scholar-advocate of "democracy
promotion" concludes from his inquiries, we find a "strong line of
continuity," extending to the present moment: democracy is sometimes
acceptable, but if and only if it is consistent with strategic and economic
interests (Thomas Carothers). Much the same holds at home, where democracy
is valued by power and privilege insofar as it "protects the opulent
minority from the majority," as Madison held. 

As the strong line of continuity illustrates, the policy planning spectrum
is narrow. The basic dilemma facing policy makers is sometimes candidly
recognized at its dovish liberal extreme, for example, by Robert Pastor,
President Carter's national security advisor for Latin America. He
explained why the administration had to support the murderous and corrupt
Somoza regime in Nicaragua, and when that proved impossible, to try at
least to maintain the US-trained National Guard even as it was massacring
the population "with a brutality a nation usually reserves for its enemy,"
killing some 40,000 people. The reason was the familiar one: "The United
States did not want to control Nicaragua or the other nations of the
region, but it also did not want developments to get out of control. It
wanted Nicaraguans to act independently, except when doing so would affect
U.S. interests adversely." The Cold War was scarcely relevant, but once
again we find the dominant operative principle, illustrated copiously
throughout history. 

Similar dilemmas faced Bush administration planners after their invasion of
Iraq. They want Iraqis "to act independently, except when doing so would
affect U.S. interests adversely." Iraq must therefore be sovereign and
democratic, but within limits. It must somehow be constructed as an
obedient client state, much in the manner of the traditional order in
Central America, where the experiences that shape foreign policy planners
are the richest and most instructive. These experiences are particularly
alive for the current administration, with its firm roots in the cruel and
savage Reagan years, when "democracy enhancement" programs were able to
restore "the basic order of....quite undemocratic societies," tolerating
only "limited, top-down forms of democratic change that did not risk
upsetting the traditional structures of power with which the United States
has long been allied" (Carothers) - by means of mass slaughter, torture,
and barbarism At a very general level, the pattern is not unfamiliar
throughout history, reaching to the opposite extreme of modern
institutional structures. The Kremlin was able to maintain satellites that
were run by domestic political and military forces, with the iron fist
poised if needed. Germany was able to do much the same in occupied Europe
even while it was at war, as did fascist Japan in Manchuria (its
Manchukuo). Fascist Italy achieved similar results in North Africa while
carrying out virtual genocide that in no way harmed its favorable image in
the West and possibly inspired Hitler: for example in Libya from 1929-1933,
a campaign waged with unspeakable brutality and ethnic cleansing on a grand
scale. Traditional imperial and neo-colonial systems illustrate many
variations on similar themes. 

To achieve the traditional goals in Iraq has proven to be surprisingly
difficult, despite unusually favorable circumstances, as already reviewed.
The dilemma of combining a measure of independence with firm control arose
in a stark form not long after the invasion, as mass non-violent resistance
compelled the invaders to accept far more Iraqi initiative than they had
anticipated, or desired. The outcome even began to evoke the nightmarish
prospect of a more or less democratic and sovereign Iraq taking its place
in a loose Shiite alliance comprising Iran, Shiite Iraq, and possibly the
nearby Shiite-dominated regions of Saudi Arabia, controlling most of the
world's oil and independent of Washington. Even the thought of such an
outcome evokes memories of the near hysteria over Nasser-led secular
nationalism in 1958, particularly when Iraq broke free of Anglo-American
domination of the vast energy resources of the Middle East. It was feared
that the "contagion" might spread even to Saudi Arabia, where the extremist
fundamentalist regime has the task of ensuring that this "stupendous source
of strategic power," "one of the greatest material prizes in world
history," remains firmly in US hands. It still performs this role, but with
increasing uncertainty. 

It could become even worse. Washington's dedicated efforts to punish Iran
for overthrowing the tyranny of the Shah in 1979 might backfire. Iran does
have options. Iran might give up on hopes that Europe could become
independent of the US, and turn eastward. If that happens, Iran will have
reasons, which have rarely been discussed in Western commentary on the
confrontation over Iranian uranium enrichment programs. In a rare break
from the silence, the reasons are discussed by Selig Harrison, a leading
specialist on these topics. "The nuclear negotiations between Iran and the
European Union were based on a bargain that the EU, held back by the US,
has failed to honour," Harrison observes: 

Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment efforts temporarily pending
the outcome of discussions on a permanent enrichment ban. The EU promised
to put forward proposals for economic incentives and security guarantees in
return for a permanent ban but subsequently refused to discuss security
issues. The language of the joint declaration that launched the
negotiations on November 14 2004, was unambiguous. "A mutually acceptable
agreement," it said, would not only provide "objective guarantees" that
Iran's nuclear programme is "exclusively for peaceful purposes" but would
"equally provide firm commitments on security issues." 

The phrase "security issues" is a thinly veiled reference to the threats by
the US and Israel to bomb Iran, and the well-publicized preparations to
carry out such an attack. The model regularly adduced is Israel's bombing
of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, which appears to have initiated
Saddam's nuclear weapons programs, another demonstration that violence
tends to elicit violence in reaction. Any attempt to execute similar plans
against Iran could lead to immediate violence, as is surely understood in
Washington. During a visit to Teheran, the influential Shiite cleric
Moqtada Sadr warned that his militia would defend Iran in the case of any
attack, "one of the strongest signs yet," the Washington Post reported,
"that Iraq could become a battleground in any Western conflict with Iran,
raising the specter of Iraqi Shiite militias -- or perhaps even the
U.S.-trained Shiite-dominated military -- taking on American troops here in
sympathy with Iran." The Sadrist bloc, which registered substantial gains
in the December 2005 elections, may soon become the most powerful single
political force in Iraq. It is consciously pursuing the model of other
successful Islamist groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, combining strong
resistance to military occupation with grassroots social organizing and
service to the poor. 

Washington's unwillingness to allow regional security issues to be
considered, tolerated by Europe, is nothing new, not just in the case of
Iran. It has arisen repeatedly in the confrontation with Iraq as well, with
serious consequences, ever since Saddam became an enemy in 1990. In the
background, raising very serious security concerns, is the matter of
Israeli nuclear weapons, a topic that Washington bars from international
consideration in violation of firm agreements and Security Council
resolutions. Beyond that lurks what Harrison rightly describes as "the
central problem facing the global non-proliferation regime": the failure of
the nuclear states to live up to their NPT obligation "to phase out their
own nuclear weapons" -- and in Washington's case, formal rejection of the
obligation. 

Unlike Europe, China refuses to be intimidated by Washington, a primary
reason for the growing fear of China on the part of US planners, which also
poses a dilemma: steps toward confrontation are inhibited by US corporate
reliance on China as an export platform and growing market, as well as
China's financial reserves, reported to be approaching Japan's in scale.
Much of Iran's oil already goes to China, and China is providing Iran with
weapons that both states presumably regard as a deterrent to US designs.
Still more uncomfortable for Washington is the fact that "the Sino-Saudi
relationship has developed dramatically," the Financial Times reports,
including Chinese military aid to Saudi Arabia and gas exploration rights
for China. By 2005, Saudi Arabia provided about 17 percent of China's oil
imports. Chinese and Saudi oil companies have signed deals for drilling and
construction of a huge refinery (with Exxon Mobil as a partner). A January
2006 visit by Saudi King Abdullah to Beijing was expected to lead to a
Sino-Saudi memorandum of understanding calling for "increased cooperation
and investment between the two countries in oil, natural gas, and
investment," the Wall Street Journal reported. 

Indian analyst Aijaz Ahmad observes that Iran could "emerge as the virtual
lynchpin in the making, over the next decade or so, of what China and
Russia have come to regard as an absolutely indispensable Asian Energy
Security Grid, for breaking Western control of the world's energy supplies
and securing the great industrial revolution of Asia." South Korea and
Southeast Asian countries are likely to join, possibly Japan as well. A
crucial question is how India will react. It rejected US pressures to
withdraw from an oil pipeline deal with Iran, though it is still
vacillating on grounds of security within Pakistani Baluchistan. Meanwhile
Pakistan has pledged to build the pipeline whatever India decides (and
presumably against US wishes). On the other hand, India joined the US and
EU in voting for an anti-Iranian resolution at the IAEA, joining also in
their hypocrisy, since India rejects the NPT regime to which Iran, so far,
appears to be largely conforming. Ahmad reports that India may have
secretly reversed its stand at the IAEA after Iran briefly threatened to
terminate a $20 billion gas deal. Washington later "warned India that
Delhi's own nuclear deal with the US could be ditched if the Indian
government did not vote to refer Tehran to the United Nations Security
Council," the Financial Times reported, eliciting a sharp rejoinder from
the Indian foreign ministry and an evasive tempering of the warning by the
US Embassy. 

India too has options. It may choose to be a US client, or it may prefer to
join a more independent Asian bloc that is taking shape, with growing ties
to Middle East oil producers. In a series of informative commentaries, the
deputy editor of The Hindu observes that "if the 21st century is to be an
`Asian century', Asia's passivity in the energy sector has to end." Though
it "hosts the world's largest producers and fastest growing consumers of
energy," Asia still relies "on institutions, trading frameworks and armed
forces from outside the region in order to trade with itself," a
debilitating heritage from the imperial era. The key is India-China
cooperation. In 2005, he points out, "India and China have managed to
confound analysts around the world by turning their much-vaunted rivalry
for the acquisition of oil and gas assets in third countries into a nascent
partnership that could alter the basic dynamics of the global energy
market." A January 2006 agreement signed in Beijing "cleared the way for
India and China to collaborate not only in technology but also in
hydrocarbon exploration and production, a partnership that eventually could
alter fundamental equations in the world's oil and natural gas sector." At
a meeting in New Delhi of Asian energy producers and consumers a few months
earlier, India had "unveiled an ambitious $22.4 billion pan-Asian gas grid
and oil security pipeline system" extending throughout all of Asia, from
Siberian fields through Central Asia and to the Middle East energy giants,
also integrating the consumer states. Furthermore, Asian countries "hold
more than two trillion dollars worth of foreign reserves," overwhelmingly
denominated in dollars, though prudence suggests diversification. A first
step, already being contemplated, is an Asian oil market trading in euros.
The impact on the international financial system and the balance of global
power could be significant. The US "sees India as the weakest link in the
emerging Asian chain," he continues, and is "trying actively to divert New
Delhi away from the task of creating new regional architecture by dangling
the nuclear carrot and the promise of world power status in alliance with
itself." If the Asian project is to succeed, he warns, "India will have to
resist these allurements." Similar questions arise with regard to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001 as a Russia-China-based
counterweight to the expansion of US power into former Soviet Central Asia,
now evolving "rapidly toward a regional security bloc [that] could soon
induct new members such as India, Pakistan, and Iran," long-time Moscow
correspondent Fred Weir reports, perhaps becoming a "Eurasian military
confederacy to rival NATO." 

The prospect that Europe and Asia might move towards greater independence
has seriously troubled US planners since World War II, and concerns have
significantly increased as the "tripolar order" has continued to evolve,
along with new and important south-south interactions (Brazil, South
Africa, India, and others), and rapidly growing EU engagement with China -
perhaps now, or soon, each other's largest trading partners. 

US intelligence has projected that the US, while controlling Middle East
oil for the traditional reasons, will itself rely mainly on more stable
Atlantic Basin resources (West Africa, Western hemisphere). Control of
Middle East oil is now far from a sure thing, and these expectations are
also threatened by developments in the Western hemisphere, accelerated by
Bush administration policies that have left the US remarkably isolated in
the global arena. The Bush administration has even succeeded in alienating
Canada, an impressive feat. Canada's relations with the US are more
"strained and combative" than ever before as a result of Washington's
rejection of Nafta decisions favoring Canada, Joel Brinkley reports.
"Partly as a result, Canada is working hard to build up its relationship
with China [and] some officials are saying Canada may shift a significant
portion of its trade, particularly oil, from the United States to China."
Canada's minister of natural resources said that within a few years
one-quarter of the oil that Canada now sends to the US may go to China
instead. In a further blow to Washington's energy policies, the leading oil
exporter in the hemisphere, Venezuela, has forged probably the closest
relations with China of any Latin American country, and is planning to sell
increasing amounts of oil to China as part of its effort to reduce
dependence on the openly hostile US government. Latin America as a whole is
increasing trade and other relations with China, with some setbacks, but
likely expansion, in particular for raw materials exporters like Brazil and
Chile. 

Meanwhile Cuba-Venezuela relations are becoming very close, each relying on
its comparative advantage. Venezuela is providing low-cost oil while in
return Cuba organizes literacy and health programs, sending thousands of
highly skilled professionals, teachers and doctors, who work in the poorest
and most neglected areas, as they do elsewhere in the third world. Joint
Cuba-Venezuela projects are also having a considerable impact in the
Caribbean countries, where Cuban doctors are providing health care to
thousands of people who had no hope of receiving it, with Venezuelan
funding. Operation Miracle, as it is called, is described by Jamaica's
ambassador to Cuba as "an example of integration and south-south
co-operation," and is generating great enthusiasm among the poor majority.
The US and Mexico apparently toyed with the idea of an oil subsidy to
counter Venezuelan petro-diplomacy, but do not seem to have pursued it.
Cuban medical assistance is also being welcomed elsewhere. One of the most
horrendous tragedies of recent years was the October 2005 earthquake in
Pakistan. In addition to the huge toll, unknown numbers of survivors have
to face brutal winter weather with little shelter, food or medical
assistance. There has been extensive coverage of Western aid, but one has
to turn to the South Asian press to read that "Cuba has provided the
largest contingent of doctors and paramedics to Pakistan," paying all the
costs (perhaps with Venezuelan funding), and that President Musharraf of
Pakistan expressed his "deep gratitude" to Fidel Castro for the "spirit and
compassion" of the Cuban medical teams. These are reported to comprise more
than 1000 trained personnel, 44 percent of them women, who remained to work
in remote mountain villages, "living in tents in freezing weather and in an
alien culture" after the Western aid teams had been withdrawn, setting up
19 field hospitals and working 12-hour shifts. 

Some analysts have suggested that Cuba and Venezuela might even unite, a
step towards further integration of Latin America in a bloc that is more
independent from the US. Venezuela has joined Mercosur, the South American
customs union, a move described by Argentine President Néstor Kirchner as
"a milestone" in the development of this trading bloc, and welcomed as
opening "a new chapter in our integration" by Brazilian President Luiz
Inácio Lula da Silva. Independent experts say that "adding Venezuela to the
bloc furthers its geopolitical vision of eventually spreading Mercosur to
the rest of the region." At a meeting in Uruguay convened to mark
Venezuela's formal entry into Mercosur, Venezuelan president Chávez said
that the organization must be "politicized": "We cannot allow this to be
purely an economic project, one for the elites and for the transnational
companies," a not very oblique reference to the US-sponsored "Free Trade
Agreement for the Americas," which has aroused strong public opposition.
Venezuela also supplied Argentina with fuel oil to help stave off an energy
crisis, and bought almost a third of Argentine debt issued in 2005, one
element of a region-wide effort to free the countries from the controls of
the IMF after two decades of disastrous effects of conformity to the rules
imposed by the US-dominated international financial institutions. The IMF
has "acted towards our country as a promoter and a vehicle of policies that
caused poverty and pain among the Argentine people," President Kirchner
said in announcing his decision to pay almost $1 trillion to rid itself of
the IMF forever. Radically violated IMF rules, Argentina enjoyed a
substantial economic recovery from the disaster left by IMF policies. 

Steps toward independent regional integration advanced further with the
election of Evo Morales in Bolivia in December 2005. He became the first
indigenous president in Bolivia, where a majority identify themselves with
indigenous groups. Morales moved quickly to reach a series of energy
accords with Venezuela. The Financial Times reported that these "are
expected to underpin forthcoming radical reforms to Bolivia's economy and
energy sector" with its huge gas reserves, second only to Venezuela's in
South America. Morales too committed himself to reverse the neoliberal
policies that Bolivia had pursued rigorously for 25 years, leaving the
country with lower per capita income than at the outset. Adherence to the
neoliberal programs was interrupted during this period only when popular
discontent compelled the government to abandon them, as when it followed
World Bank advice to privatize water supply and "get prices right" --
incidentally, to deprive the poor of access to water. 

Venezuelan "subversion," as it is described in Washington, is extending to
the US as well. Perhaps that calls for expansion of the policies of
"containment" of Venezuela ordered by Bush in March 2005. In November 2005,
the Washington Post reported, a group of Senators sent a letter "to nine
big oil companies: With huge increases in winter heating bills expected,
the letter read, we want you to donate some of your record profits to help
low-income people cover those costs." They received one response: from
CITGO, the Venezuelan-controlled company. CITGO offered to provide low-cost
oil to low-income residents of Boston, later to the Bronx and elsewhere.
Chávez is only doing it "for political gain," the State Department
responded; it is "somewhat akin to the government of Cuba offering
scholarships to medical school in Cuba to disadvantaged American youth."
Quite unlike aid from the US and other countries, which is pure-hearted
altruism. It is not clear that these subtleties will be appreciated by the
recipients of the "12 million gallons of discounted home-heating oil
[provided by CITGO] to local charities and 45,000 low-income families in
Massachusetts." The oil is distributed to poor people facing a 30-50
percent rise in oil prices, with fuel assistance "woefully underfunded, so
this is a major shot in the arm for people who otherwise wouldn't get
through the winter," according to the director of MassEnergyConsumer
Alliance, which will distribute low-cost oil to "homeless shelters, food
banks, and low-income housing groups." He also "said he hoped the deal
would present `a friendly challenge' to US oil companies -- which recently
reported record quarterly profits -- to use their windfall to help poor
families survive the winter," apparently in vain. 

Though Central America was largely disciplined by Reaganite violence and
terror, the rest of the hemisphere is falling out of control, particularly
from Venezuela to Argentina, which was the poster-child of the IMF and the
Treasury Department until its economy collapsed under the policies they
imposed. As noted, Argentina did manage to recover, but only by defying IMF
orders, which does not please international creditors or Washington. Much
of the region has left-center governments. The indigenous populations have
become much more active and influential, particularly in Bolivia and
Ecuador, both major energy producers, where they either want oil and gas to
be domestically controlled or, in some cases, oppose production altogether.
Many indigenous people apparently do not see any reason why their lives,
societies, and cultures should be disrupted or destroyed so that New
Yorkers can sit in their SUVs in traffic gridlock. Some are even calling
for an "Indian nation" in South America. Meanwhile the internal economic
integration that is underway is reversing patterns that trace back to the
Spanish conquests, with Latin American elites and economies linked to the
imperial powers but not to one another. Along with growing south-south
interaction on a broader scale, these developments are strongly influenced
by popular organizations that are coming together in the unprecedented
international global justice movements, ludicrously called
"anti-globalization" because they favor globalization that privileges the
interests of people, not investors and financial institutions. For many
reasons, the system of US global dominance is fragile, even apart from the
damage inflicted to it by Bush planners. 

One consequence is that the Bush administration's pursuit of the
traditional policies of deterring democracy, called "democracy promotion"
in the doctrinal system, face new obstacles. It is no longer as easy as
before to resort to military coups and international terrorism to overthrow
democratically elected governments, as Bush planners learned ruefully in
2002 in Venezuela. The "strong line of continuity" must be pursued in other
ways, for the most part. In Iraq, as we have seen, mass non-violent
resistance compelled Washington and London to permit the elections they had
sought to block by a series of schemes. The subsequent effort to subvert
the unwanted elections by providing substantial advantages to the
administration's favorite candidate, and expelling the independent media,
also failed. Problems still remain beyond those usually discussed. The
Iraqi labor movement is making considerable progress despite the opposition
of the occupation authorities. The situation is rather like Europe and
Japan after World War II, when a primary goal of the US and UK was to
undermine independent labor movements - as at home, for similar reasons:
organized labor contributes in essential ways to functioning democracy with
popular engagement. Many of the measures adopted at that time - withholding
food, supporting fascist police, etc. - are no longer available. Nor is it
possible today to rely on the labor bureaucracy of AIFLD to help undermine
unions. Today, some American unions are supporting Iraqi workers, just as
they do in Colombia, where more union activists are murdered than anywhere
in the world but at least now receive support from the United Steelworkers
of America and others, while Washington continues to provide enormous
funding for the government, which bears a large part of the responsibility. 

The problem of elections arose in Palestine much in the way it did in Iraq.
As already discussed, the Bush administration refused to permit elections
until the death of Yasser Arafat, aware that the wrong man would win so
that elections would not conform to the democratic vision that animates
policy. After Arafat's death, the administration agreed to respond to the
popular pressure for elections, expecting that its favored candidates in
the Palestinian Authority would win. To promote this outcome, Washington
resorted to much the same modes of subversion as in Iraq, and often before.
The national press reported that Washington used USAID as an "invisible
conduit" in an effort to "increase the popularity of the Palestinian
Authority on the eve of crucial elections in which the governing party
faces a serious challenge from the radical Islamic group Hamas," spending
"about $1.9 million of its yearly $400 million in aid to the Palestinians
on dozens of quick projects before elections this week to bolster the
governing Fatah faction's image with voters and strengthen its hand in
competing with the militant faction Hamas." As is normal, the US consulate
in East Jerusalem assured the press that the concealed efforts to promote
Fatah were merely intended "to enhance democratic institutions and support
democratic actors, not just Fatah." In the US or any Western country, even
a hint of such foreign interference would destroy a candidate, but deeply
rooted imperial mentality legitimates such routine measures of subversion
of elections elsewhere. However, the attempt to subvert the elections again
resoundingly failed. 

The US and Israeli governments now have to adjust to dealing somehow with a
radical Islamic party that approaches their traditional rejectionist
stance, though not entirely, at least if Hamas really does mean to agree to
an indefinite truce on the international border as its leaders state. The
idea is completely foreign to the US and Israel, which insist that any
political outcome must include Israeli takeover of substantial parts of the
West Bank (and the forgotten Golan Heights). Hamas's refusal to accept
Israel's "right to exist" mirrors the refusal of Washington and Jerusalem
to accept Palestine's "right to exist" - a concept unknown in international
affairs; Mexico accepts the existence of the US, but not its abstract
"right to exist" on almost half of Mexico, acquired by conquest. Hamas's
formal commitment to "destroy Israel" places it on a par with the US and
Israel, which vowed formally that there could be no "additional Palestinian
state" (in addition to Jordan) until they relaxed their extreme
rejectionist stand partially in the past few years, in the manner already
reviewed. Although Hamas has not said so, it would come as no great
surprise if Hamas were to agree to allow Jews to remain in scattered
cantons in the present Israel, while Palestine constructs huge settlement
and infrastructure projects to take over the valuable land and resources,
effectively breaking Israel up into unviable cantons, virtually separated
from one another and from some small part of Jerusalem where Jews would
also be allowed to remain. And they might agree to call the fragments "a
state." If such proposals were made, we would -- rightly -- regard them as
a reversion to Nazism, a fact that might elicit some thoughts. If such
proposals are made, Hamas's position would be essentially like that of the
US and Israel for the past five years. Before that, they refused to
consider even this impoverished form of "statehood." It is entirely fair to
describe Hamas as radical, extremist, and violent, and as a serious threat
to peace and a just political settlement. But the organization hardly is
alone in this stance. 

Elsewhere traditional means of undermining democracy have succeeded. In
Haiti, the Bush administration's favorite "democracy-building group, the
International Republican Institute," worked assiduously to promote the
fortunes of the opposition to President Aristide. The project was helped by
the withholding of desperately needed aid on grounds that were dubious at
best. When it seemed that Aristide would probably win any genuine election,
Washington and the opposition chose to withdraw, a standard device to
discredit elections that are going to come out the wrong way: Nicaragua in
1984 and Venezuela in December 2005 are examples that should be familiar.
Then followed a military coup by former state terrorists based in the
Dominican Republic (which Washington claims to have known nothing about),
expulsion of the President to South Africa, and a reign of horrifying
terror and violence, vastly exceeding anything under the elected government
that Washington helped to overthrow. The miserable fate of Haiti is
traceable in no slight measure to US intervention through the past century,
joined by France in 2004, perhaps because President Chirac was offended by
Aristide's request for some extremely limited compensation for France's own
hideous crimes in Haiti, which surpass anything since, a considerable claim
to fame. 

The persistence of the strong line of continuity to the present again
reveals that the US is very much like other powerful states. It pursues the
strategic and economic interests of dominant sectors of the domestic
population, to the accompaniment of impressive rhetorical flourishes about
its exceptional dedication to the highest values. That is practically a
historical universal, and the reason why sensible people pay scant
attention to declarations of noble intent by leaders, or accolades by their
followers. They are predictable, therefore carry virtually no information. 

One commonly hears that carping critics complain about what is wrong, but
do not present solutions. There is an accurate translation for that charge:
"They present solutions, but I don't like them." In addition to the
proposals that should be familiar about dealing with the crises that reach
to the level of survival, a few simple suggestions for the US have already
been mentioned: (1) accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court and the World Court; (2) sign and carry forward the Kyoto protocols;
(3) let the UN take the lead in international crises; (4) rely on
diplomatic and economic measures rather than military ones in confronting
the grave threats of terror; (5) keep to the traditional interpretation of
the UN Charter: the use of force is legitimate only when ordered by the
Security Council or when the country is under imminent threat of attack, in
accord with Article 51; (6) give up the Security Council veto, and have "a
decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as the Declaration of
Independence advises, even if power centers disagree; (7) cut back sharply
on military spending and sharply increase social spending: health,
education, renewable energy, and so on. For people who believe in
democracy, these are very conservative suggestions: they appear to be the
opinions of the majority of the US population, in most cases the
overwhelming majority. They are in radical opposition to public policy; in
most cases, to a bipartisan consensus. To be sure, we cannot be very
confident about the state of public opinion on matters such as these,
because of another essential feature of the democratic deficit: the topics
scarcely enter into public discussion and the basic facts are little known.
In a highly atomized society, the public is therefore largely deprived of
the opportunity to form considered opinions. 

Another conservative and useful suggestion is that facts, logic, and
elementary moral principles should matter. Those who take the trouble to
adhere to that suggestion will soon be led to abandon a good part of
familiar doctrine, though it us surely much easier to repeat self-serving
mantras. And there are other simple truths. They do not answer every
problem by any means. But they do carry us some distance toward developing
more specific and detailed answers, as is constantly done. More important,
they open the way to implement them, opportunities that are readily within
our grasp if we can free ourselves from the shackles of doctrine and
imposed illusion. 

Though it is natural for doctrinal systems to seek to induce pessimism,
hopelessness and despair, reality is different. There has been substantial
progress in the unending question for justice and freedom in recent years,
leaving a legacy that can easily be carried forward from a higher plane
than before. Opportunities for education and organizing abound. As in the
past, rights are not likely to be granted by benevolent authorities, or won
by intermittent actions - attending a few demonstrations or pushing a lever
in the personalized quadrennial extravaganzas that are depicted as
"democratic politics." As always in the past, the tasks require dedicated
day-by-day engagement to create -- in part re-create -- the basis for a
functioning democratic culture in which the public plays some role in
determining policies, not only in the political arena from which it is
largely excluded, but also in the crucial economic arena, from which it is
excluded in principle. There are many ways to promote democracy at home,
carrying it to new dimensions. Opportunities are ample, and failure to
grasp them is likely to have ominous repercussions: for the country, for
the world, and for future generations. 

Noam Chomsky is the author of numerous best-selling political works. His
latest books are Failed States, Imperial Ambitions, and Hegemony or
Survival, all in the American Empire Project series of Metropolitan Books,
9-11 (Seven Stories Press), Understanding Power (New Press), and New
Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge University Press). He
lives in Lexington, Massachusetts, and is a professor in the Department of
Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Afterword: Failed States 
Noam Chomsky 