[Mb-civic] Bombs AwayBy MAX M. KAMPELMAN

[Michael Butler]

The New York Times
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April 24, 2006
Op-Ed Contributor
Bombs Away
By MAX M. KAMPELMAN

Washington

IN my lifetime, I have witnessed two successful titanic struggles by
civilized society against totalitarian movements, those against Nazi fascism
and Soviet communism. As an arms control negotiator for Ronald Reagan, I had
the privilege of playing a role ‹ a small role ‹ in the second of these
triumphs.

Yet, at the age of 85, I have never been more worried about the future for
my children and grandchildren than I am today. The number of countries
possessing nuclear arms is increasing, and terrorists are poised to master
nuclear technology with the objective of using those deadly arms against us.

The United States must face this reality head on and undertake decisive
steps to prevent catastrophe. Only we can exercise the constructive
leadership necessary to address the nuclear threat.

Unfortunately, the goal of globally eliminating all weapons of mass
destruction ‹ nuclear, chemical and biological arms ‹ is today not an
integral part of American foreign policy; it needs to be put back at the top
of our agenda.

Of course, there will be those who will argue against this bold vision. To
these people I would say that there were plenty who argued against it when
it was articulated by Mr. Reagan during his presidency.

I vividly recall a White House national security meeting in December 1985,
at which the president reported on his first "get acquainted" summit in
Geneva with President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union the previous
month.

Sitting in the situation room, the president began by saying: "Maggie was
right. We can do business with this man." His reference to Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher prompted nods of assent. Then, in a remarkably
matter-of-fact tone, he reported that he had suggested to Mr. Gorbachev that
their negotiations could possibly lead to the United States and the Soviet
Union eliminating all their nuclear weapons.

When the president finished with his report, I saw uniform consternation
around that White House table. The concern was deep, with a number of those
present ‹ from the secretary of defense to the head of central intelligence
to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ‹ warning that our nuclear
missiles were indispensable. The president listened carefully and politely
without responding.

In fact, we did not learn where he stood until October 1986, at his next
summit meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, which took place in Reykjavik, Iceland.
There, in a stout waterfront house, he repeated to Mr. Gorbachev his
proposal for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Though no agreement was
reached, the statement had been made.

More remarkably, it had been made by someone who understood the importance
of nuclear deterrence.

In March 1985, before Reagan's first meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, I received
a telephone call on a Friday from the president's chief legislative
strategist telling me that the administration's request for additional MX
missiles was facing defeat in the House of Representatives, and that the
president wanted me to return from Geneva (where I was posted as his arms
negotiator) for a brief visit. The hope was that I might be able to persuade
some of the Democrats to support the appropriation.

I was not and never have been a lobbyist, but I agreed to return to
Washington. I wanted my first meeting to be with the speaker of the House,
Tip O'Neill, who, I was informed, was the leader of the opposition to the
appropriation.

So there I was on Monday morning in O'Neill's private office. I briefed the
speaker on the state of negotiations with the Soviets. I made the point that
I too would like to live in a world without MX missiles, but that it was
dangerous for us unilaterally to reduce our numbers without receiving
reciprocal reductions from the Soviets. I then proceeded with my round of
talks on the Hill.

At the end of the day, I met alone with the president and told him that
O'Neill said we were about 30 votes short. I told the president of my
conversation with the speaker and shared with him my sense that O'Neill was
quietly helping us, suggesting to his fellow Democrats that he would not be
unhappy if they voted against his amendment.

Without a moment's hesitation, the president telephoned O'Neill, and I had
the privilege of hearing one side of this conversation between two tough
Irishmen, cussing each other out, but obviously friendly and respectful.

I recall that the president's first words went something like this: "Max
tells me that you may really be a patriot. It's about time!" Suffice it to
say that soon after I returned to Geneva I learned that the House had
authorized the MX missiles.

THERE is a moral to these stories: you can be an idealist and a realist at
the same time. What is missing today from American foreign policy is a
willingness to hold these two thoughts simultaneously, to find a way to move
from what "is" ‹ a world with a risk of increasing global disaster ‹ to what
"ought" to be, a peaceful, civilized world free of weapons of mass
destruction.

The "ought" is an integral part of the political process. Our founding
fathers proclaimed the "ought" of American democracy in the Declaration of
Independence at a time when we had slavery, property qualifications for
voting and second-class citizenship for women.

Yet we steadily moved the undesirable "is" of our society ever closer to the
"ought" and thereby strengthened our democracy. When President Gerald Ford
signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, he was criticized for entering into a
process initiated by the Soviet Union. But the agreement reflected a series
of humanitarian "oughts," and over the course of the next 10 years, the
Soviets were forced by our European friends and us to live up to those
"oughts" if they were to attain international legitimacy.

An appreciation of the awesome power of the "ought" should lead our
government to embrace the goal of eliminating all weapons of mass
destruction.

To this end, President Bush should consult with our allies, appear before
the United Nations General Assembly and call for a resolution embracing the
objective of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction.

He should make clear that we are prepared to eliminate our nuclear weapons
if the Security Council develops an effective regime to guarantee total
conformity with a universal commitment to eliminate all nuclear arms and
reaffirm the existing conventions covering chemical and biological weapons.

The council should be assigned the task of establishing effective political
and technical procedures for achieving this goal, including both stringent
verification and severe penalties to prevent cheating.

I am under no illusion that this will be easy. That said, the United States
would bring to this endeavor decades of relevant experience, new
technologies and the urgency of self-preservation. The necessary technical
solutions can be devised. Now, as I can imagine President Reagan saying, let
us summon the will.

Max M. Kampelman headed the United States delegation to the negotiations on
nuclear and space arms in Geneva from 1985 to 1989.