[Mb-civic] In case you haven't seen this
Ivan Menchell
ivanmenchell at mac.com
Wed Apr 19 09:54:17 PDT 2006
> Senate Hearings on Bush, Now
> By Carl Bernstein
> Vanity Fair
> Monday 17 April 2006
> In this VF.com exclusive, a Watergate veteran and Vanity Fair
> contributor calls for bipartisan hearings investigating the Bush
> presidency. Should Republicans on the Hill take the high road and
> save themselves come November?
> Worse than Watergate? High crimes and misdemeanors justifying the
> impeachment of George W. Bush, as increasing numbers of Democrats
> in Washington hope, and, sotto voce, increasing numbers of
> Republicans - including some of the president's top lieutenants -
> now fear? Leaders of both parties are acutely aware of the
> vehemence of anti-Bush sentiment in the country, expressed
> especially in the increasing number of Americans - nearing fifty
> percent in some polls - who say they would favor impeachment if the
> president were proved to have deliberately lied to justify going to
> war in Iraq.
> John Dean, the Watergate conspirator who ultimately shattered the
> Watergate conspiracy, rendered his precipitous (or perhaps
> prescient) impeachment verdict on Bush two years ago in the
> affirmative, without so much as a question mark in choosing the
> title of his book Worse than Watergate. On March 31, some three
> decades after he testified at the seminal hearings of the Senate
> Watergate Committee, Dean reiterated his dark view of Bush's
> presidency in a congressional hearing that shed more noise than
> light, and more partisan rancor than genuine inquiry. The
> ostensible subject: whether Bush should be censured for
> unconstitutional conduct in ordering electronic surveillance of
> Americans without a warrant.
> Raising the worse-than-Watergate question and demanding
> unequivocally that Congress seek to answer it is, in fact, overdue
> and more than justified by ample evidence stacked up from Baghdad
> back to New Orleans and, of increasing relevance, inside a special
> prosecutor's office in downtown Washington.
> In terms of imminent, meaningful action by the Congress, however,
> the question of whether the president should be impeached (or, less
> severely, censured) remains premature. More important, it is
> essential that the Senate vote - hopefully before the November
> elections, and with overwhelming support from both parties - to
> undertake a full investigation of the conduct of the presidency of
> George W. Bush, along the lines of the Senate Watergate Committee's
> investigation during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon.
> How much evidence is there to justify such action?
> Certainly enough to form a consensus around a national imperative:
> to learn what this president and his vice president knew and when
> they knew it; to determine what the Bush administration has done
> under the guise of national security; and to find out who did what,
> whether legal or illegal, unconstitutional or merely under the
> wire, in ignorance or incompetence or with good reason, while the
> administration barricaded itself behind the most Draconian secrecy
> and disingenuous information policies of the modern presidential era.
> "We ought to get to the bottom of it so it can be evaluated, again,
> by the American people," said Senator Arlen Specter of
> Pennsylvania, the Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary
> Committee, on April 9. "[T]he President of the United States owes a
> specific explanation to the American people … about exactly what he
> did." Specter was speaking specifically about a special
> prosecutor's assertion that Bush selectively declassified
> information (of dubious accuracy) and instructed the vice president
> to leak it to reporters to undermine criticism of the decision to
> go to war in Iraq. But the senator's comments would be even more
> appropriately directed at far more pervasive and darker questions
> that must be answered if the American political system is to acquit
> itself in the Bush era, as it did in Nixon's.
> Perhaps there are facts or mitigating circumstances, given the
> extraordinary nature of conceiving and fighting a war on terror,
> that justify some of the more questionable policies and conduct of
> this presidency, even those that turned a natural disaster in New
> Orleans into a catastrophe of incompetence and neglect. But the
> truth is we have no trustworthy official record of what has
> occurred in almost any aspect of this administration, how decisions
> were reached, and even what the actual policies promulgated and
> approved by the president are. Nor will we, until the subpoena
> powers of the Congress are used (as in Watergate) to find out the
> facts - not just about the war in Iraq, almost every aspect of it,
> beginning with the road to war, but other essential elements of
> Bush's presidency, particularly the routine disregard for
> truthfulness in the dissemination of information to the American
> people and Congress.
> The first fundamental question that needs to be answered by and
> about the president, the vice president, and their political and
> national-security aides, from Donald Rumsfeld to Condoleezza Rice,
> to Karl Rove, to Michael Chertoff, to Colin Powell, to George
> Tenet, to Paul Wolfowitz, to Andrew Card (and a dozen others), is
> whether lying, disinformation, misinformation, and manipulation of
> information have been a basic matter of policy - used to overwhelm
> dissent; to hide troublesome truths and inconvenient data from the
> press, public, and Congress; and to defend the president and his
> actions when he and they have gone awry or utterly failed.
> Most of what we have learned about the reality of this
> administration - and the disconcerting mind-set and decision-making
> process of President Bush himself - has come not from the White
> House or the Pentagon or the Department of Homeland Security or the
> Treasury Department, but from insider accounts by disaffected
> members of the administration after their departure, and from
> distinguished journalists, and, in the case of a skeletal but
> hugely significant body of information, from a special prosecutor.
> And also, of late, from an aide-de-camp to the British prime
> minister. Almost invariably, their accounts have revealed what the
> president and those serving him have deliberately concealed -
> torture at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, and its apparent
> authorization by presidential fiat; wholesale N.S.A. domestic
> wiretapping in contravention of specific prohibitive law; brutal
> interrogations of prisoners shipped secretly by the C.I.A. and U.S.
> military to Third World gulags; the nonexistence of W.M.D. in Iraq;
> the role of Karl Rove and Dick Cheney's chief of staff in divulging
> the name of an undercover C.I.A. employee; the non-role of Saddam
> Hussein and Iraq in the events of 9/11; the death by friendly fire
> of Pat Tillman (whose mother, Mary Tillman, told journalist Robert
> Scheer, "The administration tried to attach themselves to his
> virtue and then they wiped their feet with him"); the lack of a
> coherent post-invasion strategy for Iraq, with all its consequent
> tragedy and loss and destabilizing global implications; the failure
> to coordinate economic policies for America's long-term financial
> health (including the misguided tax cuts) with funding a war that
> will drive the national debt above a trillion dollars; the
> assurance of Wolfowitz (since rewarded by Bush with the presidency
> of the World Bank) that Iraq's oil reserves would pay for the war
> within two to three years after the invasion; and Bush's like-
> minded confidence, expressed to Blair, that serious internecine
> strife in Iraq would be unlikely after the invasion.
> But most grievous and momentous is the willingness - even
> enthusiasm, confirmed by the so-called Downing Street Memo and the
> contemporaneous notes of the chief foreign-policy adviser to
> British prime minister Tony Blair - to invent almost any
> justification for going to war in Iraq (including sending up an
> American U-2 plane painted with U.N. markings to be deliberately
> shot down by Saddam Hussein's air force, a plan hatched while the
> president, the vice president, and Blair insisted to the world that
> war would be initiated "only as a last resort"). Attending the
> meeting between Bush and Blair where such duplicity was discussed
> unabashedly ("intelligence and facts" would be jiggered as
> necessary and "fixed around the policy," wrote the dutiful aide to
> the prime minister) were Ms. Rice, then national-security adviser
> to the president, and Andrew Card, the recently departed White
> House chief of staff.
> As with Watergate, the investigation of George W. Bush and his
> presidency needs to start from a shared premise and set of
> principles that can be embraced by Democrats and Republicans, by
> liberals and centrists and conservatives, and by opponents of the
> war and its advocates: that the president of the United States and
> members of his administration must defend the requirements of the
> Constitution, obey the law, demonstrate common sense, and tell the
> truth. Obviously there will be disagreements, even fierce ones,
> along the way. Here again the Nixon example is useful: Republicans
> on the Senate Watergate Committee, including its vice chairman,
> Howard Baker of Tennessee ("What did the president know and when
> did he know it?"), began the investigation as defenders of Nixon.
> By its end, only one was willing to make any defense of Nixon's
> actions.
> The Senate Watergate Committee was created (by a 77-0 vote of the
> Senate) with the formal task of investigating illegal political-
> campaign activities. Its seven members were chosen by the
> leadership of each party, three from the minority, four from the
> majority. (The Democratic majority leader of the Senate, Mike
> Mansfield, insisted that none of the Democrats be high-profile
> senators with presidential aspirations.) One of the crucial tasks
> of any committee charged with investigating the Bush presidency
> will be to delineate the scope of inquiry. It must not be a fishing
> expedition - and not only because the pond is so loaded with fish.
> The lines ought to be drawn so that the hearings themselves do not
> become the occasion for the ultimate battle of the culture wars.
> This investigation should be seen as an opportunity to at last rise
> above the culture wars and, as in Watergate, learn whether the
> actions of the president and his deputies have been consistent with
> constitutional principles, the law, and the truth.
> Karl Rove and other White House strategists are betting (with odds
> in their favor) that Republicans on Capitol Hill are extremely
> unlikely to take the high road before November and endorse any kind
> of serious investigation into Bush's presidency - a gamble that may
> increase the risk of losing Republican majorities in either or both
> houses of Congress, and even further undermine the future of the
> Bush presidency. Already in the White House, there is talk of a
> nightmare scenario in which the Democrats successfully make the
> November congressional elections a referendum on impeachment - and
> win back a majority in the House, and maybe the Senate too.
> But voting now to create a Senate investigation - chaired by a
> Republican - could work to the advantage both of the truth and of
> Republican candidates eager to put distance between themselves and
> the White House.
> The calculations of politicians about their electoral futures
> should pale in comparison to the urgency of examining perhaps the
> most disastrous five years of decision-making of any modern
> American presidency.
> There are huge differences between the Nixon presidency and this
> one, of course, but surprisingly few would appear to redound to
> this administration's benefit, including even the fundamental
> question of the competence of the president.
> First and foremost among the differences may be the role of the
> vice president. The excesses of Watergate - the crimes, the lies,
> the trampling of the Constitution, the disregard for the
> institutional integrity of the presidency, the dutiful and even
> enthusiastic lawbreaking of Nixon's apparatchiks - stemmed from one
> aberrant president's psyche and the paranoid assumptions that
> issued from it, and from the notion shared by some of his White
> House acolytes that, because U. S. troops were fighting a war -
> especially a failing one against a determined, guerrilla enemy in
> Vietnam - the commander in chief could assume extraordinary powers
> nowhere assigned in the Constitution and govern above the rule of
> law. "When the president does it that means that it is not
> illegal," Nixon famously told David Frost.
> Bush and Cheney have been hardly less succinct about the
> president's duty and right to assume unprecedented authority
> nowhere specified in the Constitution. "[E]specially in the day and
> age we live in … the president of the United States needs to have
> his Constitutional powers unimpaired, if you will, in terms of the
> conduct of national-security policy," Cheney said less than four
> months ago.
> Bush's doctrine of "unimpairment" - at one with his tendency to
> trim the truth - may be (with the question of his competence) the
> nub of the national nightmare. "I have the authority, both from the
> Constitution and the Congress, to undertake this vital program,"
> Bush said after more than a few Republican and conservative
> eminences said he did not and joined the chorus of outrage about
> his N.S.A. domestic-surveillance program.
> "Terrorism is not the only new danger of this era," noted George F.
> Will, the conservative columnist. "Another is the administration's
> argument that because the president is commander in chief, he is
> the 'sole organ for the nation in foreign affairs' … [which] is
> refuted by the Constitution's plain language, which empowers
> Congress to ratify treaties, declare war, fund and regulate
> military forces, and make laws 'necessary and proper' for the
> execution of all presidential powers."
> A voluminous accumulation of documentary and journalistic evidence
> suggests that the policies and philosophy of this administration
> that may be illegal and unconstitutional stem not just from Bush
> but from Cheney as well - hence there's even greater necessity for
> a careful, methodical investigation under Senate auspices before
> any consideration of impeachment in the House and its mischievous
> potential to create the mother of all partisan, ideological, take-
> no-prisoners battles, which would even further divide the Congress
> and the country.
> Cheney's recognition of the danger to him and his patron by a re-
> assertion of the Watergate precedent of proper congressional
> oversight is not hard to fathom. Illegal wiretapping - among other
> related crimes - was the basis of one of the articles of
> impeachment against Nixon passed by the House Judiciary Committee.
> The other two were defiance of subpoenas and obstruction of justice
> in the Watergate cover-up. "Watergate and a lot of the things
> around Watergate and Vietnam, both during the 1970s, served, I
> think, to erode the authority … [that] the president needs to be
> effective, especially in the national-security area," Cheney has
> observed. Nixon did not share his decision-making, much less
> philosophizing, with his vice president, and never relegated his
> own judgment to a number two. Former secretary of state Colin
> Powell's ex-chief of staff, retired army colonel Larry Wilkerson,
> has attested, "What I saw was a cabal between the vice president of
> the United States, Richard Cheney, and the secretary of defense,
> Donald Rumsfeld, on critical issues that made decisions that the
> bureaucracy did not know were being made."
> Here it may be relevant that Powell has, in private, made
> statements interpreted by many important figures in Washington as
> seemingly questioning Cheney's emotional stability, and that Powell
> no longer recognizes the steady, dependable "rock" with whom he
> served in the administration of George W. Bush's father. Powell
> needs to be asked under oath about his reported observations
> regarding Cheney, not to mention his own appearance before the
> United Nations in which he spoke with assurance about Saddam
> Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction and insisted
> that the United States was seeking a way to avoid war, not start it.
> Because Powell was regarded by some as the administration "good
> guy," who was prescient in his anxiety about Bush's determination
> to go to war in Iraq ("You break it, you own it"), he should not be
> handed a pass exempting him from tough questioning in a
> congressional investigation. Indeed, Powell is probably more
> capable than any other witness of providing both fact and context
> to the whole story of the road to war and the actions of Bush,
> Cheney, Rumsfeld, and the others.
> One of the similarities between Bush and Nixon is their contempt,
> lip service aside, for the legitimate oversight of Congress. In
> seeking to cover up his secret, illegal activities, Nixon made
> broad claims of executive privilege, many on grounds of national
> security, the most important of which were rejected by the courts.
> Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, and their colleagues have successfully
> evaded accountability for the dire consequences of their policies
> through a tried-and-true strategy that has exploited a situation in
> which the press (understandably) has no subpoena power and is held
> in ill repute (understandably) by so many Americans, and the
> Republican-controlled Congress can be counted on to ignore its
> responsibility to compel relevant, forthright testimony and
> evidence - no matter how outrageous (failure to provide sufficient
> body armor for American soldiers, for example), mendacious, or
> inimical to the national interest the actions of the president and
> his principal aides might be.
> As in Watergate, the Bush White House has, at almost every
> opportunity when endangered by the prospect of accountability, made
> the conduct of the press the issue instead of the misconduct of the
> president and his aides, and, with help from its Republican and
> conservative allies in and out of Congress, questioned the
> patriotism of the other party. As during the Nixon epoch, the
> strategy is finally wearing thin. "He's smoking Dutch Cleanser,"
> said Specter when Bush's attorney general claimed legality for the
> president's secret order authorizing the wiretapping of Americans
> by the N.S.A. - first revealed in The New York Times in December.
> Before the Times story had broken, the president was ardent about
> his civil-libertarian credentials in such matters: "Any time you
> hear the United States government talking about wiretap, it
> requires - a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has changed,
> by the way. When we're talking about chasing down terrorists, we're
> talking about getting a court order before we do so," Bush said in
> a speech in Buffalo, New York, in April 2004.
> Obviously, Bush's statement was demonstrably untrue. Yet instead of
> correcting himself, Bush attacked the Times for virtual treason,
> and his aides initiated a full-court press to track down whoever
> had provided information to the newspaper. "Our enemies have
> learned information they should not have, and the unauthorized
> disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts
> our citizens at risk," he declared, as if America's terrorist
> enemies hadn't assumed they were subject to all manner of
> electronic eavesdropping by the world's most technologically
> sophisticated nation.
> As in the Nixon White House, the search for leakers and others in
> the executive branch who might be truthful with reporters has
> become a paranoid preoccupation in the Bush White House. "Revealing
> classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and
> endangers our country," Bush added. (The special prosecutor's
> revelation that Bush himself - through Cheney - was ultimately
> behind Scooter Libby's leaking to undermine Joseph Wilson has
> ironically caused Bush more damage among Republican members of
> Congress than far more grievous acts by the president.)
> Literally dozens of investigations have been ordered at the C.I.A.,
> the Pentagon, the National Security Agency, and elsewhere in the
> executive branch to find out who is talking to the press about
> secret activities undertaken in this presidency. These include
> polygraph investigations and a warning to the press that reporters
> may be prosecuted under espionage laws.
> Bush's self-claimed authority to wiretap without a court order -
> like his self-claimed authority to hold prisoners of war
> indefinitely without habeas corpus (on grounds those in custody are
> suspected "terrorists") - stems from the same doctrine of
> "unimpairment" and all its Nixonian overtones: "The American people
> expect me to protect their lives and their civil liberties, and
> that's exactly what we're doing with this [N.S.A. eavesdropping]
> program," asserted Bush in January.
> When Nixon's former attorney general John N. Mitchell was compelled
> to testify before the Watergate Committee, he laid out the sordid
> "White House horrors," as he called them - activities undertaken in
> the name of national security by the low-level thugs and high-level
> presidential aides acting in the president's name. Mitchell, loyal
> to the end, pictured the whole crowd, from Haldeman and Ehrlichman
> and Colson down to Liddy and the Watergate burglars, as self-
> starters, acting without authority from Nixon. The tapes, of
> course, told the real story - wiretapping, break-ins, attempts to
> illegally manipulate the outcome of the electoral process, routine
> smearing of the president's opponents and intricate machinations to
> render it untraceable, orders to firebomb a liberal think tank, the
> Watergate cover-up, and their origin in the Oval Office.
> In the case of the Bush administration's two attorneys general,
> John Ashcroft and Alberto Gonzales, there are indications that - as
> in the Nixon White House - they approved and/or promulgated
> policies (horrors?) that would appear intended to enable the
> president to circumvent the Constitution and the law.
> Ashcroft expressed reservations as early as 2004 about the legality
> of the wiretapping authority claimed by Bush, according to recent
> disclosures in the press, but Ashcroft's doubts - and the
> unwillingness of his principal deputy attorney general to approve
> central aspects of the N.S.A. domestic eavesdropping plan - were
> not made known to the Congress. Gonzales, as White House counsel,
> drew up the guidelines authorizing torture at American-run prisons
> and U.S. exemption from the Geneva war-crimes conventions regarding
> the treatment of prisoners. (His memo to the president described
> provisions of the conventions as "quaint.")
> "Let me make very clear the position of my government and our
> country," said Bush when confronted with the undeniable,
> photographic evidence of torture. "We do not condone torture. I
> have never ordered torture. I will never order torture. The values
> of this country are such that torture is not a part of our soul and
> our being." The available facts would indicate this was an
> unusually evident example of presidential prevarication, but we
> will never know exactly how untruthful, or perhaps just slippery,
> until the president and the White House are compelled to cooperate
> with a real congressional investigation.
> That statement by Bush, in June 2004, in response to worldwide
> outrage at the infamous Abu Ghraib photographs, illustrates two
> related, core methodologies employed by this president and his
> cadre to escape responsibility for their actions: First, an
> Orwellian reliance on the meaninglessness of words. (When is
> "torture" torture? When is "ordered" "authorized"? When is "if
> someone committed a crime they will no longer work in my
> administration" a scheme to keep trusted aides on the payroll
> through a legal process that could take years before adjudication
> and hide the president's own role in helping start - perhaps
> inadvertently - the Plame ball rolling?)
> "Listen, I know of nobody - I don't know of anybody in my
> administration who leaked classified information," the president
> was quoted saying in Time magazine's issue of October 13, 2003.
> Time's report then noted with acuity, "Bush seemed to emphasize
> those last two words ['classified information'] as if hanging onto
> a legal life preserver in choppy seas."
> The second method of escape is the absence of formal orders issued
> down the chain of command, leaving non-coms, enlisted men and
> women, and a few unfortunate non-star officers to twist in the wind
> for policies emanating from the president, vice president,
> secretary of defense, attorney general, national-security adviser
> to the president, and current secretary of state (formerly the
> national-security adviser). With a determined effort, a committee
> of distinguished senators should be able to establish if the
> grotesque abuse of Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo was really the work of
> a "few bad apples" like Army Reserve Spc. Lynndie England wielding
> the leash, or a natural consequence of actions flowing from the
> Oval Office and Office of the Secretary of Defense.
> In a baker's dozen of hearings before pliant committees of
> Congress, a parade of the top brass from Rice to Rumsfeld, to the
> Joint Chiefs, to Paul Bremer has managed for almost three years to
> evade responsibility for - or even acknowledgment of - the
> disintegrating situation on the ground in Iraq, its costs in lives
> and treasure, and its disastrous reverberations through the world,
> and for an assault on constitutional principles at home. Similarly,
> until the Senate Watergate hearings, Nixon and his men at the top
> had evaded responsibility for Watergate and their cover-up of all
> the "White House horrors."
> With the benefit of hindsight, it is now almost impossible to look
> at the president's handling of the war in Iraq in isolation from
> his handling of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. Certainly any
> investigation of the president and his administration should
> include both disasters. Before 9/11, Bush and Condoleezza Rice had
> been warned in the starkest of terms - by their own aides, by the
> outgoing Clinton administration, and by experts on terrorism - of
> the urgent danger of a spectacular al-Qaeda attack in the United
> States. Yet the first top-level National Security Council meeting
> to discuss the subject was not held until September 4, 2001 - just
> as the F.B.I. hierarchy had been warned by field agents that there
> were suspected Islamic radicals learning to fly 747s with no
> legitimate reasons for doing so, but the bureau ultimately ignored
> the urgency of problem, just as Bush had ample opportunity (despite
> what he said later) to review and competently execute a disaster
> plan for the hurricane heading toward New Orleans.
> There will forever be four indelible photographic images of the
> George W. Bush epoch: an airplane crashing into World Trade Tower
> number two; Bush in a Florida classroom reading from a book about a
> goat while a group of second-graders continued to captivate him for
> another seven minutes after Andrew Card had whispered to the
> president, "America is under attack"; floodwaters inundating New
> Orleans, and its residents clinging to rooftops for their lives;
> and, two days after the hurricane struck, Bush peeking out the
> window of Air Force One to inspect the devastation from a safe
> altitude. The aftermath of the hurricane's direct hit, both in
> terms of the devastation and the astonishing neglect and
> incompetence from the top down, would appear to be unique in
> American history. Except for the Civil War and the War of 1812
> (when the British burned Washington), no president has ever lost an
> American city; and if New Orleans is not lost, it will only be
> because of the heroics of its people and their almost superhuman
> efforts to overcome the initial lethargy and apparent non-
> comprehension of the president. Bush's almost blank reaction was
> foretold vividly in a video of him and his aides meeting on August
> 28, 2005, the day before Katrina made landfall. The tape - withheld
> by the administration from Congress but obtained by the Associated
> Press along with seven days of transcripts of administration
> briefings - shows Bush and his Homeland Security chief being warned
> explicitly that the storm could cause levees to overflow, put large
> number of lives at risk, and overwhelm rescuers.
> In the wake of the death and devastation in New Orleans, President
> Bush refused to provide the most important documents sought by
> Congress or allow his immediate aides in the White House to testify
> before Congress about decision-making in the West wing or at his
> Crawford ranch in the hours immediately before and after the
> hurricane struck. His refusal was wrapped in a package of high
> principle - the need for confidentiality of executive branch
> communications - the same principle of preserving presidential
> privacy that, presumably, prevented him from releasing official
> White House photos of himself with disgraced lobbyist Jack Abramoff
> or allowing White House aides to testify about the N.S.A.
> electronic-eavesdropping program on grounds of executive privilege.
> The unwillingness of this president - a former Texas governor
> familiar with the destructive powers of weather - to deal
> truthfully ("I don't think anybody anticipated the breach of the
> levees," he said in an interview with Good Morning America three
> days after the hurricane hit) and meaningfully with the people of
> the Gulf Coast or the country, or the Congress, about his
> government's response ("Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job") to
> Hurricane Katrina may be the Rosebud moment of his presidency. The
> president's repeated attempts to keep secret his actions and those
> of his principal aides by invoking often spurious claims of
> executive privilege and national security in the run-up to the war
> in Iraq - and its prosecution since - are rendered perfectly
> comprehensible when seen in relation to the Katrina claim. It is an
> effective way to hide the truth (as Nixon attempted so often), and
> - when uncomfortable truths have nonetheless been revealed by
> others - to justify extraordinary actions that would seem to be
> illegal or even unconstitutional.
> Is incompetence an impeachable offense? The question is another
> reason to defer the fraught matter of impeachment (if deserved) in
> the Bush era until the ground is prepared by a proper fact-finding
> investigation and public hearings conducted by a sober,
> distinguished committee of Congress.
> We have never had a presidency in which the single unifying thread
> that flows through its major decision-making was incompetence -
> stitched together with hubris and mendacity on a Nixonian scale.
> There will be no shortage of witnesses to question about the
> subject, among them the retired three-star Marine Corps general who
> served as director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff
> during the war's planning, Gregory Newbold.
> Last week he wrote, "I now regret that I did not more openly
> challenge those who were determined to invade a country whose
> actions were peripheral to the real threat - Al Qaeda. I retired
> from the military four months before the invasion, in part because
> of my opposition to those who had used 9/11's tragedy to hijack our
> security policy." The decision to invade Iraq, he said, "was done
> with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of
> those who have never had to execute these missions - or bury the
> results." Despite the military's determination that, after Vietnam,
> "[W]e must never again stand by quietly while those ignorant of and
> casual about war lead us into another one and then mismanage the
> conduct of it.… We have been fooled again."
> The unprecedented generals' revolt against the Secretary of
> Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, is - like the special prosecutor's Plame
> investigation - a door that once cracked open, cannot be readily
> shut by the president or even his most senior aides. What outsiders
> long suspected regarding the conduct of the war has now been given
> credence by those on the inside, near the top, just as in the
> unraveling of Watergate.
> General Newbold and his fellow retired generals have (as observed
> elsewhere in the press) declared Rumsfeld unfit to lead America's
> military at almost exactly the moment when the United States must
> deal with the most difficult legacy of the Bush presidency: how to
> pry itself out of Iraq and deal with the real threat this
> administration ignored next door, from Iran.
> Rumsfeld appeared Friday on an Al Arabiya television broadcast and
> said, "Out of thousands and thousands of admirals and generals, if
> every time two or three people disagreed we changed the Secretary
> of Defense of the United States, it would be like a merry-go-
> round." This kind of denial of reality - and (again) Orwellian
> abuse of facts and language - to describe six generals, each with
> more than 30 years military experience, each of whom served at the
> top of their commands (three in Iraq) and worked closely with
> Rumsfeld, is indicative of the problem any investigation by the
> Senate must face when dealing with this presidency.
> And if Rumsfeld is unfit, how is his commander-in-chief, who has
> steadfastly refused to let him go (as Nixon did with Haldeman and
> Ehrlichman, "two of the finest public servants I have ever known"),
> to be judged?
> The roadblock to a serious inquiry to date has been a Republican
> majority that fears the results, and a Democratic minority more
> interested in retribution and grandstanding than the national weal.
> There are indications, however, that by November voters may be far
> more discerning than they were in the last round of congressional
> elections, and that Republicans especially are getting the message.
> Indeed many are talking privately about their lack of confidence in
> Bush and what to do about him.
> It took the Senate Watergate Committee less than six months to do
> its essential work. When Sam Ervin's gavel fell to close the first
> phase of public televised hearings on August 7, 1973, the basic
> facts of Nixon's conspiracy - and the White House horrors - were
> engraved on the nation's consciousness. The testimony of the
> president's men themselves - under oath and motivated perhaps in
> part by a real threat of being charged with perjury - left little
> doubt about what happened in a criminal and unconstitutional
> presidency.
> On February 6, 1974, the House voted 410 to 4 to empower its
> Judiciary Committee to begin an impeachment investigation of the
> president. On July 27, 1974, the first of three articles of
> impeachment was approved, with support from 6 of the 17 Republicans
> (and 21 Democrats) on the committee. Two more articles were
> approved on July 29 and 30. On August 8, facing certain conviction
> in a Senate trial, Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford became president.
> In Watergate, Republicans were the ones who finally told Richard
> Nixon, "Enough." They were the ones who cast the most critical
> votes for articles of impeachment, ensuring that Nixon would be
> judged with nonpartisan fairness. After the vote, the Republican
> congressional leadership - led by the great conservative senator
> Barry Goldwater - marched en masse to the White House to tell the
> criminal president that he had to go. And if he didn't, the
> leadership would recommend his conviction in the Senate and urge
> all their Republican colleagues to do the same.
> In the case of George W. Bush, important conservative and
> Republican voices have, finally, begun speaking out in the past few
> weeks. William F. Buckley Jr., founder of the modern conservative
> movement and, with Goldwater, perhaps its most revered figure, said
> last month: "It's important that we acknowledge in the inner
> counsels of state that [the war in Iraq] has failed so that we
> should look for opportunities to cope with that failure." And "Mr.
> Bush is in the hands of a fortune that will be unremitting on the
> point of Iraq.… If he'd invented the Bill of Rights it wouldn't get
> him out of this jam." And "The neoconservative hubris, which sort
> of assigns to America some kind of geo-strategic responsibility for
> maximizing democracy, overstretches the resources of a free country."
> Even more scathing have been some officials who served in the White
> House under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush's father. Bruce
> Bartlett, a domestic policy aide in the Reagan administration, a
> deputy assistant treasury secretary for the first President Bush,
> and author of a new book, Impostor: How George Bush Bankrupted
> America and Betrayed the Reagan Legacy, noted: "A lot of
> conservatives have had reservations about him for a long time, but
> have been afraid to speak out for fear it would help liberals and
> the Democrats" - a situation that, until the Senate Watergate
> Committee hearings, existed in regard to Nixon. "I think there are
> growing misgivings about the conduct of the Iraq operation, and how
> that relates to a general incompetence his administration seems to
> have about doing basic things," said Bartlett.
> After Nixon's resignation, it was often said that the system had
> worked. Confronted by an aberrant president, the checks and
> balances on the executive by the legislative and judicial branches
> of government, and by a free press, had functioned as the founders
> had envisioned.
> The system has thus far failed during the presidency of George W.
> Bush - at incalculable cost in human lives, to the American
> political system, to undertaking an intelligent and effective war
> against terror, and to the standing of the United States in parts
> of the world where it previously had been held in the highest regard.
> There was understandable reluctance in the Congress to begin a
> serious investigation of the Nixon presidency. Then there came a
> time when it was unavoidable. That time in the Bush presidency has
> arrived.
> ----------
> Carl Bernstein is a Vanity Fair contributing editor. His biography
> of Hillary Rodham Clinton will be published by Knopf next year.
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