[Mb-civic] How We've Improved Intelligence - John A. Kringen - Washington Post Op-Ed

[William Swiggard]

How We've Improved Intelligence
Minimizing the Risk of 'Groupthink'
<>
By John A. Kringen
The Washington Post
Monday, April 3, 2006; A19

Nearly one year ago, President Bush's commission on weapons of mass 
destruction released its report identifying shortcomings in the 
intelligence community. Many of the commission's judgments dealt with 
analysis, the discipline I lead at the CIA. The primary criticism was 
that our analysts were "too wedded to their assumptions" and that our 
tradecraft -- the way we analyze a subject and communicate our findings 
-- needed strengthening.

We did not try to hide from the criticism or make excuses. Our 
assessment of Saddam Hussein's WMD capabilities was flawed. The fact 
that foreign intelligence services made similar errors in no way 
absolved us of ours.

We in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) have been intent on improving 
our work by addressing the commission's recommendations -- and those of 
several other self-initiated and external reviews -- head-on. We have 
taken many steps in the past year to assure the president, Congress and 
the American people that they can be confident in the integrity of our 
assessments.

CIA Director Porter Goss has encouraged innovation and creativity in how 
the CIA approaches its mission. In the DI, we have been diligent in 
integrating fresh thinking and new perspectives into our analysis. Our 
in-house training center, the Sherman Kent School, features lessons 
learned from the Iraq WMD case; they are part of tradecraft courses 
taken by our analysts, including every recruit entering the DI. Our 
newest analysts -- and all first-line supervisors -- also have completed 
classes on alternative analysis and other analytic techniques.

We have established analytic tradecraft units across the directorate, 
including the office drafting our WMD assessments, that promote the use 
of alternative and competitive analysis techniques. DI analysts 
routinely engage academics and outside experts -- last year we did so 
about 100 times a month at conferences or informal meetings -- to test 
hypotheses and minimize the potential for being ensnared by 
"groupthink." And we have a staff that routinely evaluates the quality 
of our assessments.

We have enhanced the precision and transparency of our written products, 
making a point of stating clearly and upfront what we know -- and what 
we don't. Our analysts now offer policymakers greater context on 
sourcing, including an intelligence asset's access and biases, thanks to 
increased information-sharing between the DI and the National 
Clandestine Service. A computerized system for identifying recalled or 
modified raw intelligence reports alerts analysts to sources whose 
information is determined to be faulty.

When Porter Goss selected me as director of intelligence, he expressed 
his concern that for too long we had concentrated on satisfying the 
daily demand for current intelligence assessments to the detriment of 
preparing for the strategic threats and opportunities of tomorrow. What 
are the implications of rapid advances in technology for U.S. national 
security? What are the challenges and opportunities posed by Islamic 
political activism in the Middle East and South Asia? Is there another 
A.Q. Khan proliferation network out there?

The DI's strategic research program for fiscal 2006 focuses on 
identifying and assessing long-term trends and emerging foreign threats 
that go beyond today's headlines. DI analysts also participate heavily 
in long-term analytic projects led by our colleagues in the intelligence 
community, especially the National Intelligence Council. The benefit is 
clear: Our policymakers will have a better idea of what might lie over 
the horizon.

Even as we strengthen our strategic analytical capabilities, we continue 
to be the principal source for current intelligence analysis that the 
director of national intelligence provides to our most senior 
policymakers. Not only are we helping to staff important DNI components, 
but DI analysts are also in demand throughout the intelligence community.

The DI is building bench strength with highly qualified recruits to meet 
the demands of strategic global coverage. We brought in more new 
analysts in fiscal 2005 than in any year in our history, breaking our 
previous record by more than 50 percent. More important than the 
numbers, however, are the education and life experiences our employees 
bring to the job. Half of our applicants in process claim 
fluent-to-native capacity in a foreign language, and many have spent 
significant time in their region of specialty.

Above all, we seek to foster in each analyst a sense of individual 
initiative, responsibility and ownership, as well as the recognition 
that providing analysis vital to our national security requires 
challenging orthodoxy and constantly testing our assumptions. Mastering 
the fundamentals of tradecraft and building expertise are critical, but 
we also must aspire to a level of creativity and insight that allows us 
to look beyond the obvious and flag the unexpected. Only then can we 
truly fulfill our obligation to help protect the American people.

The writer is director of intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/02/AR2006040201094.html
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