[Mb-civic] (no subject)
Hawaiipolo at cs.com
Hawaiipolo at cs.com
Fri Jul 1 12:51:21 PDT 2005
Pretty compelling analysis.....Iraq is not another Vietnam..rather it is the
USA's Afghanistan....MD>
> The December Decision
> By Stirling Newberry
> t r u t h o u t | Perspective
>
> Thursday 30 June 2005
>
> On October 9th 2001, in the shadow of the 9/11 attacks and as part of the
> preparations for going to war in Afghanistan, a series of essays were prepared
> on previous involvements in that country. One of documents prepared, edited
> by Svetlana Savranskaya, was on the lessons of the Soviet invasion and
> occupation from 1979 until 1988. Afghanistan has a long history of foreign
> intervention, having been one of the key squares in the "Great Game" between Russia
> and England.
>
> In dry national security prose, the report noted that "the last war of the
> Soviet Union created or aggravated the internal dynamics that eventually
> culminated in the dissolution of the country itself." This is, perhaps, too strong
> a phrasing, but it certainly didn't help. Moreover, the ease of the invasion
> and the failure of the occupation created certain sharp lessons for other
> powers that seek to impose their will by direct force.
>
> The first lesson was the invasion itself: in the run-up to the invasion, the
> USSR General Staff objected to the small size of the force and the rather
> broad objectives. The USSR wanted to root out those who had crossed it and
> impose a Soviet-style government on Afghanistan, not merely fulfill some simple
> regime change or removal of particular leadership.
>
> The second lesson followed from the first: the USSR had limited intelligence
> about the political make-up of the factions in Afghanistan, and they
> expected it to be like other poor peripheral countries, for example, Mongolia. This
> lack of clear information and willingness to "form a picture" were mistakes
> that compounded the lack of force commitment. The Soviet Union expected to be
> seen as liberators, or at least as an improvement, bringing with them
> technology, teaching and training. Instead they found that the populace rejected
> them as "infidels," and instead of being able to secure the cooperation of the
> local power centers, they found little immediate resistance, but also no
> reconciliation. Even their own friends on the ground were divided along ethnic and
> religious lines.
>
> This much became clear rather early, and the military leadership pressed for
> either withdrawal of the "Limited Contingent" or some clearly defined goal
> or exit strategy. Neither was accomplished, because of the political
> centralization and rot within the Soviet Politburo itself. In 1985, the Politburo
> decided to decide, but it would wait until 13 November 1986, when there would be
> a full discussion of how to exit from Afghanistan. By this point, Gorbachev
> accuses their allies of "walking like a pretzel" - meaning weaving around
> every issue and being disingenuous - and warns that unless some important change
> of policy is undertaken, that Afghanistan will continue for another 20 or 30
> years of fighting. It is now 20 years from the time of that meeting, and the
> fighting has continued, even if the USSR is now a motif for t-shirts, and not
> a government.
>
> But it is Gromyko who argues for realpolitik in the meeting: that there are
> still political options, even though military ones have failed. He argues
> that an attempt to modernize Afghanistan is not realistic, that the USSR will
> have to accept Afghanistan as a neutral country, and he notes there is no
> internal support: the USSR has lost as many men from Afghanistan as it drafted.
> The politburo called for a hard exit date, a withdrawal of troops within two
> years. But it would not save the USSR or its political allies in Afghanistan.
>
> By 1988, the Soviet military and political establishment were busy doing a
> post-mortem on Afghanistan. The political leadership agreed that going in had
> been a mistake, but argued that there had been repeated requests from a
> fellow Soviet bloc government - and thus a legitimate use of military power. The
> military assessment was far harsher and far more direct, as expressed in a
> CPSU letter of 10 May 1988.
>
> The lessons the Soviet military drew were concise:
>
>
> Insufficient intelligence;
> The ability of small units to use terrain against large formations;
> "Complete disregard" for the local populace and its reactions;
> Failure to win the populace over to the regime;
> Placing all reliance on a "military solution";
> Long term combat operations degrading the military. From the US side, the
> lessons to be drawn from the Soviet invasion were a complementary image:
> political failure combined with loss of control of the road network, which led to
> an increasing reliance on helicopters, which were vulnerable to anti-aircraft
> missiles.
>
> And now we have reached that most dangerous of mileposts: the transportation
> network that the military relies on in Afghanistan and Iraq. Amateurs talk
> strategy, professionals talk logistics. Strategy is what you can do with what
> you can get there. The gem of the Cold War military system was not the
> fighter bombers, the aircraft carriers, or even the ICBM deterrent, instead it was
> the logistical network that allowed the US to project force farther and
> faster than any other nation, such that no nation felt itself too far out of
> American reach for too long.
>
> The indications in the run-up to the invasion of Afghanistan were that
> American logistical capability was stretched, that there had been failures of new
> software and shortages of needed equipment. This failure becomes more visible
> with time: the lack of armored HumVees and flack jackets were the flesh
> wounds, caught by IED shrapnel. The loss of the ability to truck material and the
> reliance on rotary wing aircraft is a more dangerous failure, and a more
> militarily grievous loss, because it costs that which is very expensive to
> replace: pilots, specialists and commanding officers. The kind of people of which
> there is a limited supply, and which take years to fully replace.
>
> It is this same attrition of valuable personnel which ended up being the
> death knell for Soviet occupation. It could no longer staff its chain of
> command, coordinate or control defense missions, nor could it reliably move people
> from one place to another. This undercut the political objectives of "national
> reconciliation," because reconciliation is dependent on a clear and imposing
> presence which cannot be delayed, denied or defeated.
>
> The harsh conclusion is that the very documents being read in the Pentagon
> in the days after 9/11 provided clear warnings not to go into a nation without
> intelligence, not to go in with a "limited contingent," not to set large and
> sweeping goals of political transformation, and not to rely on an
> increasingly fragile military instrument to effect change. The Downing Street Memos
> show how, systematically, these points were ignored by key US envoys to Great
> Britain, and the final invasion of Iraq ended up looking like the invasion of
> Afghanistan by the USSR. That is, politically compelled for ideological
> reasons, but constrained by economic and military shortages.
>
> With the crash of a Chinook troop transport helicopter, lost, in all
> probability, to hostile fire, the parallels between the Soviet invasion and
> occupation of Afghanistan and the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq should be held
> to closer parallel. Consider that, from the point of invasion to the 10 May
> letter, the Soviets had suffered, on average, 5 killed per day of
> involvement, and 13 wounded. The United States has suffered only 2.3 killed, but 16
> wounded. In other words, the intensity of American combat in Iraq differs from
> the Soviet presence in Afghanistan only in that better American evacuation and
> medical technology, plus better armor, saves 3 people every day who otherwise
> would have died.
>
> In short, the United States is fighting its own version of the war that,
> according to the the foreign policy intellectual establishment, either brought
> down or hastened the fall of the USSR. We have engaged in the same mistakes:
> the Downing Street Memos of March 2002 show a determination to invade but an
> admission that there is poor intelligence on troops, deployment of Weapons of
> Mass Destruction and the state of Saddam's air force. There is no mention
> made of non-conventional or guerrilla warfare, just as the planning documents of
> the Soviet invasion do not once mention the possibility of a resistence
> developing. There is a reliance on an outside trained elite that, it is admitted,
> has no credibility on the ground.
>
> It was a Soviet politician who reminded his fellow politburo members that
> with each person's death and closing of the eyes, a unique world comes to an
> end. It might also be added that when a nation closes its eyes to the lessons
> of the past, it too sets itself on a course toward its own death, a journey to
> that country "from which no traveler returns."
>
>
>
> Stirling Newberry is an internet business and strategy consultant, with
> experience in international telecom, consumer marketing, e-commerce and forensic
> database analysis. He has acted as an advisor to Democratic political
> campaigns and organizations and is the the co-founder, along with Christopher Lydon,
> Jay Rosen and Matt Stoller, of BopNews, as well as being the military
> affairs editor of The Agonist. -------
>
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