[Mb-civic] FW: Sorkin in MEQ: "Missing the Target on Nonproliferation?"

[Golsorkhi]

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From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2005 21:24:52 -0500
Subject: Sorkin in MEQ: "Missing the Target on Nonproliferation?"



Begin forwarded message:
>
>
> Missing the Target on Nonproliferation?
>
> by Jerry Sorkin
> Middle East Quarterly
> Winter 2005
> http://www.meforum.org/article/671
>
> In September 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled a new national
> security strategy that underscored the dangers posed by the
> proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). "The gravest
> danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and
> technology," he wrote. Central to the president's strategy was
> "proactive counter-proliferation."[1]
>
> More than two years later, how goes this strategy? There has been some
> success. The Libyan regime has abandoned its nuclear program. But the
> threat from Iran and North Korea looms larger than ever. And, while
> North Korea spreads missile technology throughout the Middle East, and
> Iran works to enrich weapons-grade uranium, there is evidence that,
> rather than rolling back proliferation, U.S. policymakers are missing
> the target, instead spending their resources chasing phantoms. While
> the Islamic Republic of Iran systematically built its centrifuges and
> imported reactor parts, in a Kafkaesque situation, the full wrath of
> U.S. counter-proliferation efforts descended upon my suburban
> Philadelphia antiques business.
>
> The Growing Proliferation Problem
>
> Washington's concern about Iranian intentions is well justified, even
> if its counter-proliferation strategy appears misdirected. Iranian
> officials make no secret of their desire to develop nuclear
> capability. On October 6, 2004, for example, Iranian president
> Muhammad Khatami, told reporters, "We have to maintain our right to
> obtain nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without being subject to
> any conspiracies or pressures."[2] Less than a week later, Iranian
> foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi told a European energy conference,
> "The time has come for Europe to take a step forward and suggest that
> our legitimate right for complete use of nuclear energy is recognized
> (in return for) assurances that our program will not be diverted
> towards weapons."[3] While proponents of critical engagement might
> argue that Kharrazi was showing flexibility, his statement carried a
> threatening undercurrent, especially given past Iranian actions.
>
> On December 14, 2001, for example, Expediency Council chairman and
> former president ŒAli Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani ascended the podium at
> Tehran University in order to deliver the Islamic Republic's formal
> sermon. Rafsanjani declared,
>
> If one day, this Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like
> those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists' strategy will
> reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside
> Israel will destroy everything,[4]
>
> Bush and the State Department are correct to recognize that a number
> of countries have catalyzed or even enabled the Islamic Republic's
> nuclear ambitions. In 1995, Russia agreed to sell Iran one VVER-1000
> nuclear reactor, 2,000 tons of uranium, and provide training for up to
> twenty employees.[5] Beijing agreed to assist Iran's efforts to enrich
> nuclear fuel.[6] While the International Atomic Energy Association
> (IAEA) inspects Bushehr's light-water reactor, real danger exists that
> the Bushehr plant can provide cover for other Russian-Iranian nuclear
> exchanges.[7] The August 2002 revelation that the Islamic Republic had
> constructed a secret underground uranium enrichment facility in Natanz
> brought the issue to light again.
>
> The Islamic Republic has used the space created by the European
> Union's "critical engagement" policy to bolster its weapons programs.
> The EU is now Iran's largest trading partner. EU trade with Iran has
> doubled since 1999.[8] Bilateral trade now exceeds $13 billion. EU
> External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten explained, "There is more
> to be said for trying to engage and to draw these societies into the
> international community than to cut them off."[9] International
> companies have also bolstered Iran's chemical weapons capability. In
> March 2000, for example, the Islamic Republic contracted with the
> German firm Salzgitter Anlagenblau to build a 1,450-kilogram per hour
> phosgene generator.[10] While phosgene has legitimate industrial
> applications, it can be used in chemical munitions to cause
> respiratory failure.
>
> Iran's missile program also relies on outside technology. The Shihab-3
> intermediate range ballistic missile is derived from North Korea's
> Nodong-1 missile, modified with Russian technology.[11] On September
> 21, 2004, Iranian president Khatami presided over a military parade
> displaying the Shihab-3. Draped over a trailer carrying the Shihab-3
> was a banner saying, "We will crush America under our feet."[12]
>
> Retroactive Sanctions
>
> Iran's nuclear program developed to its current state because of the
> failure of successive administrations to counter proliferation
> effectively. Less than a year after issuing his national security
> strategy, Bush initiated an executive order meant to reverse that
> trend. On July 3, 2003, President Bush issued an executive order,
> quietly listed in The Federal Register as simply "Public Notice
> 4370."[13] This order, made retroactive to May 9, 2003, imposed
> sanctions on firms that "contributed materially to the efforts of Iran
> to use, acquire, design, develop, produce, or stockpile missiles
> capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction." The primary
> targets of this executive order were five major shipping companies,
> four of which were Chinese and one North Korean.[14]
>
> The effectiveness of Executive Order 13094 in countering Iranian
> proliferation is unclear. Neither the White House nor the Department
> of State has publicized the success of these sanctions or reported any
> detail regarding the effectiveness of the executive order in stopping
> the flow of arms to Iran despite repeated requests.
>
> On May 10, 2003, thirteen days before the executive order was listed
> in The Federal Register, a 40-foot container left the port of Tianjin,
> China, destined for Philadelphia. The cargo, worth $32,000, consisted
> of three Oriental rugs and 300 crates of Chinese antique furniture.
> The goods and shipping costs were paid for months prior to the
> announcement of sanctions. My agent in China chose to ship with China
> North Trading, also known as NORINCO. The reason was simple: NORINCO
> is one of the largest trading companies in China. As such, it is able
> to provide one-stop service, including freight forwarding,
> consolidation, shipping, and documents.
>
> One month later, upon arrival at the Philadelphia port, the U.S.
> Customs and Border Patrol seized the shipment; they did not inform me
> of this for almost a month. Authorities of the U.S. Customs and Border
> Patrol, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control,
> State Department, and even the White House concur that nothing in the
> shipment violated U.S. import laws.[15] Not only were there no weapons
> of mass destruction, but there also was not a single item that could
> possibly have any industrial use. Nineteenth century Chinese wooden
> cabinets do not make good centrifuges.
>
> While authorities confirmed that I did nothing wrong while importing
> the shipment into the United States, its seizure was no
> miscalculation. Rather, it is symbolic of a U.S. failure to adopt
> policy that moves beyond symbolism to counter proliferation
> effectively.
>
> Bush may have meant well when he targeted the shipping companies, but
> misdirected and uneven enforcement does little to stop proliferation,
> especially when the State Department considers a bargain with Iran to
> make available nuclear technology in exchange for a pledge not to
> develop nuclear weapons, sponsor terrorism, or interfere with
> stability in Iraq.[16] Retroactive sanctioning and seizure actually
> counters traditional U.S. practice. "Historically, as in the cases of
> sanctions imposed upon Sudan and Syria, a grace period was allowed
> at least for those shipments that were already in transit," according
> to Margaret Gatti, a specialist in international and U.S. Custom's
> law.[17] For example, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
> Act of 1996 provided a 30-day delay in the sanctions' effective date
> for trade contracts that were concluded prior to the date sanctions
> were announced.[18] The Syrian sanctions, on the other hand, called
> their grace period a "savings clause," which prescribed that "items
> that are on dock for loading, on lighter, laden aboard an exporting
> carrier or en route aboard a carrier to a port of export" on May 14,
> 2004, the date sanctions commenced, "remain subject to the licensing
> rules applicable to such items" as of May 13, 2004.[19] The Sudanese
> sanctions allowed a two-week grace period by which time the export had
> to occur.
>
> The retroactive sanctions may have affected a number of other
> companies, both large and small. While the State Department, Treasury
> Department, and U.S. Customs have refused to name other companies
> caught in the retroactive sanctions Catch-22, Phillip Saunders and
> Stephanie Lieggi, specialists in nonproliferation policies and
> U.S.-China relations, say that retroactive sanctions on NORINCO likely
> cast a large net which penalized many U.S. businesses in no way
> involved in proliferation:
>
> NORINCO has sizeable business ties with U.S. companies and offices in
> the United States. The sanctions may cost NORINCO as much as $100
> million a year in lost exports to the United States and are also
> likely to hurt NORINCO's U.S. trading partners, which include large
> corporations such as Wal-Mart and Kmart.[20]
>
> Such companies, with ample funds for lobbying, may have been able to
> come to special arrangements with the Bush administration.
>
> Almost nine months after the seizure, the office of John Bolton,
> undersecretary of state for arms control and international security,
> appeared to offer some help. In March 2004, his special assistant,
> Mark Groombridge, advised that the State Department had decided to
> reverse its decision to seize the antiques and that the goods would be
> released. Groombridge wrote to my lawyer:
>
> The person who needs to sign the requisite document is out of the
> country. It will be taken care of this week or next. I had to go to a
> high level to reverse the decision. Consequently, that person needs to
> sign it personally Š I know this has been frustrating for your client
> but sometimes the system works, however slowly. Trust me on this. I
> said I would get it done. I will.[21]
>
> Despite Groombridge's promise, a month later he called to say that the
> State Department had again reversed its decision and that he could
> provide no further comment.[22] John S. Wolf, assistant secretary of
> state for nonproliferation, explained the decision in a June 24, 2004
> letter:
>
> The question of a grace period for items shipped before the effective
> date of the executive order penalties imposed on NORINCO (May 23,
> 2003) but not arriving in the United Sates until after the effective
> dates has been reviewed, taking into full account your particular
> circumstances. These sanctions were imposed Š based on a determination
> that NORINCO contributed materially to the efforts of Iran to use,
> acquire, design, develop, produce, or stockpile missiles capable of
> delivering weapons of mass destruction. It was determined that the
> establishment of a grace period would not be appropriate given the
> paramount need to stop proliferation to Iran.
>
> In an October 26, 2004 letter, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
> Armitage confirmed the decision to uphold the sanctions' retroactive
> clauses and not only liquidate the antiques but penalize me further
> with U.S. Customs' storage charges.[23]
>
> The failure to provide a grace period or waiver is counter to
> precedent. While Wolf's commitment is laudable, the State Department
> has been unable to show that the sanctions have had any effect on
> proliferation. Indeed, the State Department seems more intent on
> targeting businesses, perhaps hoping to appear aggressive, while
> giving weapons proliferators a free hand. Talks about North Korea have
> bogged down as Pyongyang denies having any uranium enrichment program,
> despite evidence to the contrary.[24] On October 5, 2004, former
> Iranian president Rafsanjani, perhaps the second-most powerful man in
> Iran, announced that Iran had increased the range of its Shihab-3
> missile to 1,200 miles, capable of reaching all of Israel, Turkey, or
> even Europe.[25]
>
> The seizure of the antiques‹bought and shipped prior to the
> announcement of sanctions‹would be more understandable had Bolton's
> office shown the same diligence with regard to seized weapons cargo.
> On December 10, 2002, U.S. and Spanish forces boarded a freighter in
> the Indian Ocean. A search revealed fifteen North Korean Scud missiles
> hidden beneath sacks of cement. Two days later, U.S. authorities
> allowed the ship to proceed to Yemen where authorities said it
> purchased the missiles for defensive purposes.[26] Unclear is why a
> supposed U.S. ally in the war against terror would surreptitiously
> purchase North Korean missiles and, if legally bought as Yemen
> maintained, why such cargo would be concealed. U.S. intelligence
> officials, frustrated with the decision of Undersecretary Bolton to
> allow the ship to proceed, questioned whether Yemen was the ultimate
> destination of such missiles. After all, Yemen has little defensive
> need for such weapons.[27] North Korea is an active proliferator,
> though, and its missile technology provides the basis for Iran's
> Shihab-3 ballistic missile.[28]
>
> The U.S. State Department has also rewarded Libya, despite Mu'ammar
> Qadhafi's ongoing double game. Bush has cited Libya as a model of
> counter-proliferation success. On December 19, 2003, he revealed that,
> after nine months of talks, Libyan strongman Qadhafi had agreed to
> "disclose and dismantle all weapons of mass destruction."[29] The
> extent of Libya's illicit weapons program came as a surprise to U.S.
> intelligence.[30]
>
> Nevertheless, Qadhafi's sincerity is questionable. Not long after
> Qadhafi commenced his secret negotiations with U.S. and British
> intelligence officials, the U.S. Navy caught his regime red-handed
> seeking to import equipment to enrich uranium.[31] Only when caught
> did he come clean. Now that the Bush White House has resumed
> diplomatic relations with Libya,[32] and the European Union has lifted
> its arms embargo,[33] Qadhafi may use his new freedom to pursue old
> projects. The signs of Libyan sincerity are not good. Soon after
> Washington lifted sanctions on Libya, evidence emerged that Qadhafi
> sponsored a plot to assassinate Saudi crown prince Abdullah.[34] Two
> weeks after Bush lauded Qadhafi's release of leading dissident Fathi
> El-Jahmi as a sign of real change, Libyan security had not only
> arrested El-Jahmi again but imprisoned his wife and son as well.[35]
>
> Tilting at Windmills
>
> The Bush administration eloquently stated the danger of proliferation
> in the 2002 national security strategy. The intersection of technology
> and rogue regimes presents a grave and gathering threat to the
> security of the United States. The very seriousness of the threat
> makes more disturbing high-level policy decisions which absolve
> regimes such as Qadhafi's and release seized missile components such
> as those discovered offshore Yemen while bringing down the full-force
> of Kafkaesque retroactive law upon the small businessmen and citizens
> whose protection the president has sworn to uphold. While the
> president has admitted "miscalculations" with regard to the war on
> terrorism and Iraq,[36] there has yet to be White House recognition
> that misapplication of counter-proliferation policy has failed in its
> target. Sanctions are an important policy tool. Thomas Jefferson spoke
> of sanctions as one of the few policy tools short of war available to
> governments. If sanctions are not effective, then one step is removed
> on the path from diplomacy to war. The use of sanctions as well as
> other diplomatic and trade policies aimed at punishing regimes must
> not be so inflexible as to supersede our country's duty to correct an
> oversight when policy implementation brings harm to unintended
> targets.
>
> Jerry Sorkin is a Philadelphia entrepreneur.
>
> [1] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
> September 2002 (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), p. 14.
> [2] China Economic Net (Beijing), Oct. 7, 2004.
> [3] Aljazeera.com (International English edition, London), Oct. 12,
> 2004.
> [4] Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio, Dec. 14, 2001.
> [5] Michael Eisenstadt, "Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to
> Iran: Policy Challenges for the United States," Arms Control Today,
> Mar. 2001; The Washington Post, May 4, 1995; Michael Eisenstadt,
> Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions, policy paper no.
> 42 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
> 1996), p. 14.
> [6] Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power, p. 15; The Washington Post,
> Apr. 17, 1995.
> [7] Robert J. Einhorn, assistant secretary of state for
> non-proliferation, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
> Committee, Washington, D.C., Oct. 5, 2000.
> [8] "Bilateral Trade Relations: Iran," Directorate General Trade of
> the European Commission, Brussels, Jan. 2004.
> [9] The Guardian (London), Feb. 9, 2002.
> [10] Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, Mar. 31, 2000.
> [11] "Iran's Shihab-3 Missile," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin,
> Aug. 5, 2000.
> [12] The Daily Star (Lebanon), Sept. 22, 2004.
> [13] Executive Order 12938, amended by Executive Order 13094, in
> "Notices," Federal Register, vol. 68, no. 130, July 8, 2003.
> [14] The New York Times, July 4, 2003.
> [15] Lou Dobbs Tonight, CNN, July 16, 2003; The Philadelphia Inquirer,
> July 20, 2003; The New York Times, July 26, 2003.
> [16] The International Herald Tribune (Paris), Sept. 21, 2004.
> [17] Interview with author, office of Gatti and Associates,
> Haddonfield, N.J., Oct. 15, 2004.
> [18] R. Richard Newcomb, director, U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign
> Assets Control, testimony before the Senate Banking, Housing, and
> Urban Affairs Committee, Oct. 30, 1997.
> [19] "Sudanese Sanctions Regulations," U.S. Department of the
> Treasury, sec. 538.506, p. 656.
> [20] Phillip C. Saunders and Stephanie C. Lieggi, "What's behind U.S.
> Nonproliferation Sanctions against NORINCO?" Center for
> Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,
> May 30, 2003.
> [21] E-mail from Mark Groombridge to attorney Tim Rolland, Mar. 15,
> 2004.
> [22] Telephone conversation with the author's attorney, Apr. 15, 2004.
> [23] Letter from Richard Armitage to Sen. Arlen Spector (R-Pa.), Oct.
> 26, 2004.
> [24] The New York Times, Oct. 13, 2004.
> [25] Financial Times, Oct. 5, 2004.
> [26] CNN.com, Dec. 12, 2002.
> [27] Ibid.
> [28] "Iran's Shihab-3 Missile."
> [29] George W. Bush, "Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs," White
> House news release, Dec. 19, 2003.
> [30] The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 27, 2004.
> [31] The Washington Times, Sept. 9, 2004.
> [32] The Washington Post, June 29, 2004.
> [33] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, Oct. 12, 2004.
> [34] The International Herald Tribune, June 10, 2004.
> [35] Claudia Rosett, "Dial a Dissident," OpinionJournal, Apr. 7, 2004;
> "Dissident Watch," Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2004, p. 89.
> [36] The New York Times, Aug. 27, 2004.
>
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