[Mb-civic] FW: MEF Wire: Eisenstadt on "Iran's nuclear ambitions & U.S. options"

[Golsorkhi]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2005 01:11:42 -0400
Subject: MEF Wire: Eisenstadt on "Iran's nuclear ambitions & U.S. options"



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>
> Iran's nuclear ambitions & U.S. options
>
> A briefing by Michael Eisenstadt
> Summary posted on April 11, 2005
> http://www.meforum.org/article/699
>
> Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for
> Near East Policy and director of its Military and Security Studies
> Program. His books on Iran include Iran Under Khatami (1998) and
> Iranian Military Power (1996). Mr. Eisenstadt has published several
> articles and monographs on Persian Gulf affairs and U.S. strategy in
> the Middle East. He addressed the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia on
> March 16, 2005.
>
> The Iranian nuclear program is not unique to the current Islamist
> regime. Iran's nuclear program predates the Islamic Republic. It
> commenced under Shah Mohamed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the ruler overthrown
> in the revolution of 1978-79 that brought Ayatollah Khomeini to power.
> There is a strong nationalist strain on both the left and right of
> Iranian politics that sees membership of the nuclear club as proper to
> Iran's place in the world. In short, Iranian nuclear ambitions are not
> regime-dependent. An array of geo-political factors would probably
> push a successor regime in the same direction, although it would
> probably be easier to manage the implications of proliferation if the
> country was headed by a more democratic regime.
>
> Iran's motivations for developing nuclear weapons are diverse and
> varied. Firstly, it seeks what most powers seek by acquiring nuclear
> weapons: power, prestige, and influence; also deterrence and a sense
> of self-reliance. Accordingly, the policy implication is that Iran is
> not motivated exclusively or even primarily by security concerns, but
> by a variety of factors. It follows that U.S. security guarantees are
> unlikely to be sufficient to dissuade Iran from pursuing nuclear
> weapons.
>
> The Nuclear Timeline
>
> How long it will take Iran to become a nuclear power will depend on
> the route it takes in its development program. There are three broad
> possibilities. Iran might seek to complete a uranium enrichment
> program within 3-5 years. Alternatively, it could seek to conclude a
> program of plutonium separation some 15-18 months after the start up
> of its reactor at Bushehr. Or it could seek fissile material from
> abroad (Pakistan or North Korea), which would mean that weaponization
> could take place within a few months, providing Iranian scientists
> have the know-how and means to build a weapon. This means that within
> a few years at most, Iran will be a de facto nuclear weapons state, or
> be perceived to be a nuclear weapons state.
>
> Implications of a Nuclear Iran
>
> If Iran goes nuclear there will be a number of political consequences.
> First, it will further demoralize those seeking political change, and
> strengthen the regime hard-liners ­ at least in the short term.
> Long-term pressure for internal reform will of course remain but those
> pushing reform will have been set back. This in turn will result in
> Iran's neighbors becoming increasingly solicitous of Iranian opinion.
> Some, like Saudi Arabia and various oil-rich Gulf states, might seek
> an independent WMD capability, and some will seek to strengthen
> security cooperation with the U.S. Israel would probably further
> reduce the thin veneer of ambiguity surrounding its own nuclear
> program. Such developments, if they came to pass, might have second-
> and third-order consequences.
>
> For example, Turkey is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons, is a NATO
> member and hopes for EU membership, but it would be hard to believe
> that such a major change in its threat environment will not have an
> impact on its defense policy and military doctrine.
>
> The Lebanese terrorist group Hizbullah is perhaps the only group
> Tehran would probably entrust with nuclear weapons. Deniability will
> be crucial to Tehran in arming this group without involving
> consequences for its own security. Of more immediate concern is
> potential for Iranian support for Hizbullah and Palestinian terrorist
> groups to draw one day Iran into a confrontation with Israel, which
> could assume a nuclear dimension. Certainly there was just such a type
> of risk when the crisis between India and Pakistan in early 2002
> nearly lead to war, deriving from a terror attack on the Indian
> parliament in December 2001.
>
> Policy Options
>
> There are a number of important considerations in framing a U.S.
> response to possible developments such as these. Delaying the day Iran
> becomes a nuclear power is still important, but the U.S. is reaching a
> point of diminishing returns, because Iran is becoming increasingly
> self-sufficient in the nuclear realm. A diplomatic deal that sees Iran
> relinquish its quest for a nuclear capability is unlikely, because
> Iran refuses to compromise over enrichment and reprocessing
> capabilities and also because the most potent lever ­ the possibility
> of an oil embargo ­ is off the table due to already high oil prices.
>
> Preventive military action is not the attractive option it might be
> thought to be, because the U.S. may not have sufficiently detailed
> intelligence required for success, due to the immense secrecy
> surrounding the program and its strategic dispersal across the
> country.
>
> However the possibility of military action must remain on the table as
> a spur to diplomacy, and because the necessary conditions for success
> might be fulfilled, as a result of dogged intelligence work, or dumb
> luck. A combination of deterrence and containment might eventually be
> what the U.S. is forced to do, since it seems unlikely that the U.S.
> will succeed in dissuading Iran from going nuclear.
>
> The current Iranian leadership would probably prefer to be isolated
> with the bomb, than on warm terms with the international community
> without the bomb. But the Iranian leadership probably does not see the
> choice in this way; it might well believe that it can have its cake
> and eat it too. There are major challenges in creating a stable
> deterrent relationship with Iran. But Iran's leadership does not have
> a martyrdom complex, and does not seek to destroy itself. It wants to
> survive and continue enjoying its life of privilege and will not take
> steps that could lead to destruction of the Islamic Republic.
>
> So we will need skill and luck.


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