[Mb-civic] FW: "GET USED TO A NUCLEAR IRAN" says Iran Nukes Team Director!

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From: Samii Shahla <shahla at thesamiis.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2005 16:54:02 -0400
Subject: Fwd: "GET USED TO A NUCLEAR IRAN" says Iran Nukes Team Director!



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> Inquiry and Analysis Series - No. 218
>
> April 7, 2005
> No.218
>

> Head of Iranian Nuclear Negotiating Team Sirus Nasseri: "We Are
> Walking on a Knife's Edge"; U.S. and EU Should "Get Used to the Idea
> of a Nuclear Iran"
> By: A. Savyon*
>
>
> Introduction
>
> At the end of the first three-month period of negotiations stipulated
> in the November 2004 Paris Agreement signed by Iran and the EU Three
> (Britain, France, and Germany), a steering committee of
> representatives of all the parties met for a joint assessment of the
> situation. It was decided that the negotiations would continue as Iran
> maintained its suspension of uranium-enrichment activity.(1) At the
> same time, the commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and armed
> forces announced that they were prepared for a possible military
> attack.
>
>
>  Iran's Reaction to the New U.S. Initiative
>
> The international media recently reported a change in U.S. policy
> toward Iran, citing as evidence the U.S.'s March 11, 2005 statement
> that it would agree to offer Iran benefits and incentives, such as
> dropping its veto of Iran's candidacy for the World Trade
> Organization, and permitting Tehran to purchase spare parts for
> civilian airplanes. This would be in exchange for Iran's cooperation
> in the nuclear issue, with the aim of attaining a permanent cessation
> of Iran's uranium-enrichment activity. It should be noted that the day
> before the "change" in U.S. policy was reported, U.S. President George
> W. Bush extended the sanctions on Iran for another year.(2)
>
> Iran rejected the U.S. offer, calling it "ridiculous,"(3) and an
> Iranian spokesmen claimed that these measures could not be considered
> "confidence-building" because Iran was in any case entitled to WTO
> membership, and because there should never have been restrictions on
> the purchase of spare parts for civilian airplanes in the first
> place.(4) Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani
> explained: "We will make no deal on enrichment. Economic incentives,
> including purchasing the Airbus and joining the World Trade
> Organization, will not compensate for giving up enrichment."(5)
>
> The U.S.'s willingness to correct its past errors and lift the
> sanctions it had imposed on Iran would not be considered incentives
> according to Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi: "No economic
> incentive is equal to Iran's right [to develop nuclear energy]."(6)
>
> Furthermore, Iranian spokesmen noted that they were expecting genuine
> confidence-building measures on the part of the U.S.: removing the
> freeze on the billions of dollars in Iranian assets in U.S. banks,
> lifting U.S. sanctions on Iran, and reversing the hostile U.S. policy
> towards Iran. Only then would Iran reconsider its policy toward the
> U.S. - but no matter what, uranium enrichment and the development of
> nuclear energy would remain Iran's right as a sovereign state, and
> would remain non-negotiable.(7)
>
>
>  The Iranian-European Deadlock
>
> The Iran-EU Three negotiations currently underway are at a deadlock.
> According to reports, the EU Three have demanded that Iran permanently
> suspend all uranium-enrichment activity, while Iran remains
> uncompromising in its insistence that there be no permanent suspension
> of such activity and that as a sovereign nation signatory to the
> Non-Proliferation Treaty it is entitled to enrich uranium.(8)
>
> In his recent visit to Paris, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami
> explained the Iranian position: "Our basis for discussions [with the
> EU Three] is the November 2004 Paris Agreement, which recognizes
> Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology." "Iran has
> provided a comprehensive proposal for continuation of the talks, which
> has been received positively by the Europeans, notably France."(9)
>
> Iranian officials called the EU Three demand for a permanent
> suspension "a blatant breach of the [Paris] Agreement" (in which the
> Europeans agreed to recognize Iran's right to develop nuclear
> energy).(10) It should be mentioned that the EU Three did indeed
> recognize this right in principle because Iran is an NPT member, but
> still did not agree to Iran enriching uranium in high percentages that
> would allow the development of nuclear weapons.(11)
>
> According to an official Iranian spokesman, Iran's Supreme National
> Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani said in a meeting between
> the Council of Experts with Former President and Expediency Council
> Chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani, "At no price will Iran consent to a
> permanent suspension of its uranium-enrichment activity."(12)
>
> Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi was resolute on the issue: "Iran is
> determined to pursue the enrichment process, and others cannot stop
> [its] uranium-enrichment program."(13)
>
> Head of the Iranian negotiating team in the nuclear committee in the
> EU Three-Iran talks, Sirus Nasseri, recently stated that there is no
> possibility of Iran permanently relinquishing its uranium enrichment:
> "This is something we are not willing to consider."(14) The U.S. and
> the EU should "get used to the idea of a nuclear Iran."(15)
>
> French ambassador to Tehran François Nicoullaud made it clear that the
> referral of the Iranian dossier to the U.N. Security Council was "a
> real danger," even though the parties have decided to continue
> negotiations. He made it clear that the European considerations
> transcend the Iranian issue, saying: "...The decision that will be
> made regarding the [Iranian] dossier will constitute a model for other
> countries in the world."(16)
>
>
>  Iran's Negotiating Positions
>
>  Iranian spokesmen said that the negotiations are currently focusing
> on the issue of "objective guarantees" that Iran is to give the EU
> Three to assure them that it is enriching uranium strictly for
> civilian, not military purposes - and not on the EU demand that Iran
> permanently suspend uranium enrichment.(17)
>
> Referring to the guarantees offered by Iran during the negotiations,
> Iranian President Khatami said that his country "presented to Europe
> five detailed proposals, and they [the Europeans] should provide us
> with solid security guarantees."(18)
>
> On another occasion, Khatami added: "Iran is ready to give formal
> guarantees that it will never produce nuclear arms in return for
> respect for its legitimate right to possess fuel cycle plants under
> IAEA safeguards." He also said that Iran wanted nothing more than what
> the international conventions had authorized.(19)
>
>  Also stating that Iran is ready to give assurances that it will not
> produce bomb-grade uranium, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi added: "We
> do not intend to enrich to the level that is needed to make atomic
> bombs and have imposed a limit ... that we enrich [uranium only] to
> the level we need for nuclear (reactor) fuel."(20)
>
> According to reports, Iran has proposed a limited uranium-enrichment
> project, under which it would keep 500 centrifuge sets to enrich
> uranium up to 5.3%, under close IAEA monitoring. The EU Three has
> rejected this proposal and demanded a permanent suspension of uranium
> enrichment, arguing that this plan for a pilot centrifuge project for
> uranium enrichment could be diverted by Iranian scientists to gather
> findings for military use.(21)
>
> It should be noted, however, that international treaties and
> regulations permit NPT member states to produce low-enriched uranium
> (LEU) solely for civilian purposes. The level of enrichment permitted
> for these purposes is 3%-7%, and it is subject to IAEA inspection and
> must follow IAEA notification. In contrast, high-enriched uranium
> (HEU), necessary for military purposes, is between 20%-90%.
>
> In an extensive interview, Sirus Nasseri discussed Iran's position in
> the negotiations with the EU Three: "Iran will soon present its final
> proposal and will set a target date for the EU to either accept or
> reject it. We do not want confrontation, but if they cannot respond to
> what we believe to be rational, they can choose their own path because
> we are ready to flex our muscles..."
>
> "It is clear to me that we are walking on a knife's edge. There is no
> guarantee that we will reach an agreement. What I can say with
> certainty is that during the negotiations we witnessed, step by step,
> more willingness to be flexible on the part of the Europeans. At the
> same time, this does not mean that they have the ability to reach an
> agreement with us. The EU must accept Iran's uranium-enrichment
> program..."(22)
>
> "For the Europeans, success in these talks - at least at this stage -
> is vital. For us, it is [merely] an advantage. We'd prefer to reach an
> agreement and go about our business, because it would improve our
> relations, but it is not imperative. It is up to the Europeans to
> choose their path... If these talks fail, and [Europe] is not able to
> advance them, it would find it difficult to play a major role in any
> important global political issue. This is a crucial point. This also
> gives us room to maneuver vis-à-vis Europe and to use it as a buffer -
> not a mediator - between us and [the U.S.], with which we are in
> conflict.
>
> "...We truly want to produce fuel. Why should we care that technically
> speaking, this enrichment-based fuel production can also be used for
> something else?... What is important is our intention... Moreover, we
> allow supervision.
>
> "...One thing worries us, and because of it, we told the Europeans
> that their time is running out. We said: 'We don't know what deal you
> made with the Americans, and your denial of such a deal is unclear to
> us.' There is a danger that their offer will improve to a point that
> if we reject it, they could claim that they made Iran an excellent
> offer and that its rejection indicates a desire for nuclear weapons.
> This is indeed a danger. Therefore, the negotiations have become much
> more difficult, the pressure has increased, there is more tension, and
> we are getting to a point when we might take the final step."(23)
>
>
>  Additional Iranian Threats
>
> Alongside the negotiations, threats have also been made by several top
> Iranian officials.(24) Iranian President Mohammad Khatami told a press
> conference: "The Europeans will suffer more than Iran if they decide
> to capitulate to U.S. pressure" and that "The enemies will be damaged
> more if they decide to do something against Iran."(25)
>
> Khatami said that the EU Three's demand that Iran commit to a
> permanent halt of its uranium-enrichment activity was "a blatant
> breach of the Paris Agreement." He added, "The Europeans will bear the
> responsibility for what might happen."(26)
>
> Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Hassan Rowhani
> told a press conference that Iran would "halt all its
> confidence-building measures" if its dossier was transferred to the
> U.N. Security Council. "If Europe refuses to accept [the formula Iran
> has suggested to the EU], it will face problems..."(27)
>
> At a recent international nuclear technology conference in Tehran,
> Rowhani added: "If [Iran-EU] negotiations fail because of the U.S.
> pressure and the Iranian nuclear dossier is referred to the U.N.
> Security Council, the region will come up against serious problems,
> and regional security will be jeopardized."(28)
>
> Former representative to the IAEA, Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi was even more
> blunt, telling the Iranian daily Kayhan: "Europe should understand
> that its security is closely linked to Iran's security."(29)
>
>
>  Iran Declares its Military Preparedness
>
> In recent months, commanders of Iran's Revolutionary Guards and armed
> forces have announced their complete preparedness for a possible
> military attack on Iran's nuclear installations and other sensitive
> sites. Iranian spokesmen have declared that Iran's response would be
> formidable. Recently, the London daily Al-Hayat published a report on
> Iran's preparedness for an American or Israeli attack. The following
> are excerpts:(30)
>
> "Iranian military sources say that the armed forces and the
> Revolutionary Guards have made all the field preparations for handling
> a surprise attack on targets within Iran. [These preparations] are not
> limited to the nuclear installations, which are dispersed among the
> cities and various locations - Bushehr, Isfahan, Arak, Natanz, Tehran,
> Yazd, and others - but also include military and industrial plants and
> dams.
>
> "...Iran's military command has taken into account the possibility of
> a disruption of [communications] between military posts and the
> central command... As a precautionary measure, the command has ordered
> all military and Revolutionary Guards sectors to respond swiftly -
> within no more than an hour and without waiting for orders - against
> pre-selected targets, [in light of anticipated] international
> political pressures that might force Iran to not respond.
>
> "The objective is to deliver a harsh blow to the U.S. and its ally
> Israel at the outset, and then to expand the arena, in light of
> international efforts to contain the crisis and limit its scope and
> intensity, so as to ignite the whole region. This way Iran will assure
> its right to respond.
>
> "...All the countries that host U.S. military forces - particularly
> Iraq, CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] in Al-Siliya [Qatar], the
> Al-'Odeid base in Qatar, and the Fifth Fleet command in Bahrain - are
> among the sites Iran might consider as targets. However, the biggest
> fish of all is Israel, which is likely to suffer 'hellfire' -
> particularly when the Iranian response 'will use [varied] weapons and
> reach other targets that the aggressors are not expecting them [to
> reach].'
>
> "These sources added that although Iran anticipates a devastating
> attack that will destroy a significant part of its economic and
> industrial achievements of the past 26 years, it is now pondering an
> issue that seems to it to be justified: Can the Bush administration
> grasp that it will have to send home at least five [dead] American
> soldiers per day? And how will the administration respond to the
> [American] people, who will question the benefit of the attack on
> Iran..."
>
> According to Al-Hayat, Iranian military sources had reported that
> during a meeting between a French diplomat and Expediency Council
> Chairman Rafsanjani, the diplomat asked Rafsanjani whether Iran would
> relinquish its nuclear program, and was answered with an unequivocal
> "no." When the diplomat said that the U.S. had selected 325 targets
> within Iran as the first targets in any possible American attack,
> Rafsanjani explained to his guest that the Iranian counter-attack
> would be just as powerful and devastating.
>
> The report continued, "When the Western diplomat asked, 'What if the
> place in which you are convening (the Marble Palace, a few dozen
> meters from the Islamic Republic's Presidential Building and the
> residence of Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei) is also among the targets?'
> Rafsanjani answered succinctly, 'Even if I am the target, [Iran will
> not relinquish its nuclear program].'"
>
>
> *Ayelet Savyon is Director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project.
>
> Endnotes:
> (1) See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 209, "Iran seeks E.U. Consent
> for Modeling Its Nuclear Program on the Japanese-German Model - i.e.
> Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities - Three Months Short of a Bomb,"
> February 23, 2005,
> http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20905
> .
> MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 200, "The Iran-EU Agreement on Iran's
> Nuclear Activity," December 21, 2004,
> http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20004
> .
> Sirus Nasseri announced that the negotiations had ended without a
> final accord and that each side remained steadfast in its position.
> IRNA (Iran), March 24, 2005.
> (2) Iran Daily (Iran), March 12, 2005. President Bush noted that Iran
> constitutes "an unusual and extraordinary threat." Bush accused Iran
> of "support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the
> Middle East peace process, and acquisition of weapons of mass
> destruction and the means to deliver them."
> (3) Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi,  ISNA (Iran), March 13,
> 2005.
> (4) Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi, Aftab-e Yazd
> (Iran), March 7, 2005;  IRNA (Iran), March 13, 2005.
> (5) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005.
> (6) IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005. Similar statements were made by
> Iranian President Khatami, IRNA (Iran), March 31, 2005; Iranian
> Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rowhani, IRNA (Iran),
> March 5, 6, 2005. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Asefi said,
> "Correction of some mistakes and removal of a few unjustifiable
> restrictions will never persuade Iran to give up its legitimate
> rights."  IRNA (Iran), March 12, 2005.
> (7) Supreme National Security Council Foreign Relations Committee
> Secretary Hossein Mussavian, Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 15, 2005. Iran
> rejected U.S. participation in the negotiations. Rowhani said: "We
> still doubt America's goodwill. They are not fair in negotiations and
> they use threats against Iran. They intend to transfer the Iranian
> nuclear file to the Security Council." IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005.
> Foreign Ministry Spokesman Asefi also said that U.S. participation
> would be "destructive." IRNA (Iran), March 13, 14, 2005.
> (8) See Rowhani's statements at a press conference, Kayhan (Iran),IRNA
> (Iran), March 5, 2005; Khatami during a visit to Venezuela, IRNA
> (Iran), March 13, 2005.
> (9) IRNA (Iran), April 6, 2005.
> (10) Statements by Iranian President Khatami,  Kayhan (Iran), March
> 15, 2005, IRNA (Iran), March 16, 2005. Sirus Nasseri stated that the
> E.U. Three demand for a permanent suspension of Iran's enrichment
> activities was not included in the Paris Agreement and that the E.U.
> Three should accept Iran's uranium-enrichment activity. Sharq, Tehran
> Times (Iran), March 15, 2005. See MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 200
> on the Paris Agreement, "The Iran-E.U. Agreement on Iran's Nuclear
> Activity," December 21, 2004,
> http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20004.
>  (11) International treaties and regulations permit the production of
> low-enriched uranium (LEU), at 3%-7%, for civilian purposes, and
> require prior notification to the IAEA and full IAEA inspection. For
> military purposes, high-enriched uranium (HEU), at 20%-90%, is
> required.
> (12)  IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005, Jomhouri-e Eslami (Iran), March 17,
> 2005.
> (13) Kayhan (Iran), February 24, 2005.
> (14)  IRNA (Iran), March 24, 2005.
> (15) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 1, 2005.
> (16) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), April 5, 2005.
> (17) Rowhani at a press conference, Tehran Times (Iran), February 27,
> 2005.
> (18) Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), March 16, 2005, IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005.
> (19) IRNA (Iran), April 4, 2005.
> (20) IRNA (Iran), March 15, 2005.
> (21) Sharq (Iran), March 16, 2005; Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Iran), April 3,
> 2005,  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany), April 1, 2005.
> (22)  Sharq, Tehran Times, (Iran) March 15, 2005.
> (23) Sirus Nasseri in an interview with Iranian TV 2. See MEMRI-TV
> Clip 609, http://memritv.org/Search.asp?ACT=S9&P1=609.
> (24) For previous threats see MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 189,
> "Iran's Nuclear Policy Crisis," September 21, 2004,
>  http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA18904.
>  MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 743, "Iran Threatens the West," July 13,
> 2004,
> http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=SP74304.
>  (25) Kayhan (Iran), Aftab-e Yazd (Iran), February 24, 2005.
> (26) Kayhan (Iran), March 15, 2005, IRNA, March 16, 2005.
> (27) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005. Rowhani was referring to the model
> proposed by Iran and based on the Japanese/German model. See MEMRI
> Inquiry and Analysis No. 209, "Iran seeks E.U. Consent for Modeling
> its Nuclear Program on the Japanese-German Model - i.e. Nuclear Fuel
> Cycle Capabilities - Three Months Short of a Bomb," February 23, 2005,
> http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=countries&Area=iran&ID=IA20905.
>  (28) IRNA (Iran), March 5, 2005.
> (29) Kayhan (Iran), March 9, 2005.
> (30) Al-Hayat (London), March 29, 2005.
>
>
>   
>
>
>
>  

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