[Mb-civic] Noam Chomsky on The 2004 Elections
ean at sbcglobal.net
ean at sbcglobal.net
Sat Dec 11 11:55:51 PST 2004
Noam Chomsky's writings are always a bit dense because they are
packed with so much information and revelation....and this is a bit
long...but well worth reading to expand understanding and vision...
________________________
The 2004 Elections
by Noam Chomsky
The elections of November 2004 have received a great deal of
discussion, with exultation in some quarters, despair in others,
and general lamentation about a "divided nation." They are
likely to have policy consequences, particularly harmful to the
public in the domestic arena, and to the world with regard to
the "transformation of the military," which has led some
prominent strategic analysts to warn of "ultimate doom" and
to hope that US militarism and aggressiveness will be
countered by a coalition of peace-loving states, led by - China!
(John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher, Daedalus). We have
come to a pretty pass when such words are expressed in the
most respectable and sober journals. It is also worth noting
how deep is the despair of the authors over the state of
American democracy. Whether or not the assessment is
merited is for activists to determine.
Though significant in their consequences, the elections tell us
very little about the state of the country, or the popular mood.
There are, however, other sources from which we can learn a
great deal that carries important lessons. Public opinion in the
US is intensively monitored, and while caution and care in
interpretation are always necessary, these studies are valuable
resources. We can also see why the results, though public, are
kept under wraps by the doctrinal institutions. That is true of
major and highly informative studies of public opinion
released right before the election, notably by the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) and the Program on
International Policy Attitudes at the U. of Maryland (PIPA), to
which I will return.
One conclusion is that the elections conferred no mandate for
anything, in fact, barely took place, in any serious sense of the
term "election." That is by no means a novel conclusion.
Reagan's victory in 1980 reflected "the decay of organized
party structures, and the vast mobilization of God and cash in
the successful candidacy of a figure once marginal to the `vital
center' of American political life," representing "the continued
disintegration of those political coalitions and economic
structures that have given party politics some stability and
definition during the past generation" (Thomas Ferguson and
Joel Rogers, Hidden Election, 1981). In the same valuable
collection of essays, Walter Dean Burnham described the
election as further evidence of a "crucial comparative
peculiarity of the American political system: the total absence
of a socialist or laborite mass party as an organized competitor
in the electoral market," accounting for much of the "class-
skewed abstention rates" and the minimal significance of
issues. Thus of the 28% of the electorate who voted for
Reagan, 11% gave as their primary reason "he's a real
conservative." In Reagan's "landslide victory" of 1984, with
just under 30% of the electorate, the percentage dropped to
4% and a majority of voters hoped that his legislative program
would not be enacted.
What these prominent political scientists describe is part of
the powerful backlash against the terrifying "crisis of
democracy" of the 1960s, which threatened to democratize the
society, and, despite enormous efforts to crush this threat to
order and discipline, has had far-reaching effects on
consciousness and social practices. The post-1960s era has
been marked by substantial growth of popular movements
dedicated to greater justice and freedom, and unwillingness to
tolerate the brutal aggression and violence that had previously
been granted free rein. The Vietnam war is a dramatic
illustration, naturally suppressed because of the lessons it
teaches about the civilizing impact of popular mobilization.
The war against South Vietnam launched by JFK in 1962,
after years of US-backed state terror that had killed tens of
thousands of people, was brutal and barbaric from the outset:
bombing, chemical warfare to destroy food crops so as to
starve out the civilian support for the indigenous resistance,
programs to drive millions of people to virtual concentration
camps or urban slums to eliminate its popular base. By the
time protests reached a substantial scale, the highly respected
and quite hawkish Vietnam specialist and military historian
Bernard Fall wondered whether "Viet-Nam as a cultural and
historic entity" would escape "extinction" as "the countryside
literally dies under the blows of the largest military machine
ever unleashed on an area of this size" - particularly South
Vietnam, always the main target of the US assault. And when
protest did finally develop, many years too late, it was mostly
directed against the peripheral crimes: the extension of the
war against the South to the rest of Indochina - terrible crimes,
but secondary ones.
* State managers are well aware that they no longer have that
freedom. Wars against "much weaker enemies" - the only
acceptable targets -- must be won "decisively and rapidly,"
Bush I's intelligence services advised. Delay might "undercut
political support," recognized to be thin, a great change since
the Kennedy-Johnson period when the attack on Indochina,
while never popular, aroused little reaction for many years.
Those conclusions hold despite the hideous war crimes in
Falluja, replicating the Russian destruction of Grozny ten
years earlier, including crimes displayed on the front pages for
which the civilian leadership is subject to the death penalty
under the War Crimes Act passed by the Republican Congress
in 1996 - and also one of the more disgraceful episodes in the
annals of American journalism.
The world is pretty awful today, but it is far better than
yesterday, not only with regard to unwillingness to tolerate
aggression, but also in many other ways, which we now tend
to take for granted. There are very important lessons here,
which should always be uppermost in our minds - for the
same reason they are suppressed in the elite culture. Returning
to the elections, in 2004 Bush received the votes of just over
30% of the electorate, Kerry a bit less. Voting patterns
resembled 2000, with virtually the same pattern of "red" and
"blue" states (whatever significance that may have). A small
change in voter preference would have put Kerry in the White
House, also telling us very little about the country and public
concerns.
As usual, the electoral campaigns were run by the PR
industry, which in its regular vocation sells toothpaste, life-
style drugs, automobiles, and other commodities. Its guiding
principle is deceit. Its task is to undermine the "free markets"
we are taught to revere: mythical entities in which informed
consumers make rational choices. In such scarcely imaginable
systems, businesses would provide information about their
products: cheap, easy, simple. But it is hardly a secret that
they do nothing of the sort. Rather, they seek to delude
consumers to choose their product over some virtually
identical one. GM does not simply make public the
characteristics of next year's models. Rather, it devotes huge
sums to creating images to deceive consumers, featuring
sports stars, sexy models, cars climbing sheer cliffs to a
heavenly future, and so on. The business world does not spend
hundreds of billions of dollars a year to provide information.
The famed "entrepreneurial initiative" and "free trade" are
about as realistic as informed consumer choice. The last thing
those who dominate the society want is the fanciful market of
doctrine and economic theory. All of this should be too
familiar to merit much discussion.
Sometimes the commitment to deceit is quite overt. The
recent US-Australia negotiations on a "free trade agreement"
were held up by Washington's concern over Australia's health
care system, perhaps the most efficient in the world. In
particular, drug prices are a fraction of those in the US: the
same drugs, produced by the same companies, earning
substantial profits in Australia though nothing like those they
are granted in the US - often on the pretext that they are
needed for R&D, another exercise in deceit. Part of the reason
for the efficiency of the Australian system is that, like other
countries, Australia relies on the practices that the Pentagon
employs when it buys paper clips: government purchasing
power is used to negotiate prices, illegal in the US. Another
reason is that Australia has kept to "evidence-based"
procedures for marketing pharmaceuticals.
US negotiators denounced these as market interference:
pharmaceutical corporations are deprived of their legitimate
rights if they are required to produce evidence when they
claim that their latest product is better than some cheaper
alternative, or run TV ads in which some sports hero or model
tells the audience to ask their doctor whether this drug is
"right for you (it's right for me)," sometimes not even
revealing what it is supposed to be for. The right of deceit
must be guaranteed to the immensely powerful and
pathological immortal persons created by radical judicial
activism to run the society. When assigned the task of selling
candidates, the PR industry naturally resorts to the same
fundamental techniques, so as to ensure that politics remains
"the shadow cast by big business over society," as America's
leading social philosopher, John Dewey, described the results
of "industrial feudalism" long ago. Deceit is employed to
undermine democracy, just as it is the natural device to
undermine markets. And voters appear to be aware of it.
On the eve of the 2000 elections, about 75% of the electorate
regarded it as a game played by rich contributors, party
managers, and the PR industry, which trains candidates to
project images and produce meaningless phrases that might
win some votes. Very likely, that is why the population paid
little attention to the "stolen election" that greatly exercised
educated sectors. And it is why they are likely to pay little
attention to campaigns about alleged fraud in 2004. If one is
flipping a coin to pick the King, it is of no great concern if the
coin is biased.
In 2000, "issue awareness" - knowledge of the stands of the
candidate-producing organizations on issues - reached an all-
time low. Currently available evidence suggests it may have
been even lower in 2004. About 10% of voters said their
choice would be based on the candidate's
"agendas/ideas/platforms/goals"; 6% for Bush voters, 13% for
Kerry voters (Gallup). The rest would vote for what the
industry calls "qualities"or "values," which are the political
counterpart to toothpaste ads. The most careful studies (PIPA)
found that voters had little idea of the stand of the candidates
on matters that concerned them. Bush voters tended to believe
that he shared their beliefs, even though the Republican Party
rejected them, often explicitly. Investigating the sources used
in the studies, we find that the same was largely true of Kerry
voters, unless we give highly sympathetic interpretations to
vague statements that most voters had probably never heard.
Exit polls found that Bush won large majorities of those
concerned with the threat of terror and "moral values," and
Kerry won majorities among those concerned with the
economy, health care, and other such issues. Those results tell
us very little.
It is easy to demonstrate that for Bush planners, the threat of
terror is a low priority. The invasion of Iraq is only one of
many illustrations. Even their own intelligence agencies
agreed with the consensus among other agencies, and
independent specialists, that the invasion was likely to
increase the threat of terror, as it did; probably nuclear
proliferation as well, as also predicted. Such threats are simply
not high priorities as compared with the opportunity to
establish the first secure military bases in a dependent client
state at the heart of the world's major energy reserves, a region
understood since World War II to be the "most strategically
important area of the world," "a stupendous source of strategic
power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world
history."
Apart from what one historian of the industry calls "profits
beyond the dreams of avarice," which must flow in the right
direction, control over two-thirds of the world's estimated
hydrocarbon reserves - uniquely cheap and easy to exploit -
provides what Zbigniew Brzezinski recently called "critical
leverage" over European and Asian rivals, what George
Kennan many years earlier had called "veto power" over them.
These have been crucial policy concerns throughout the post-
World War II period, even more so in today's evolving tripolar
world, with its threat that Europe and Asia might move
towards greater independence, and worse, might be united:
China and the EU became each other's major trading partners
in 2004, joined by the world's second largest economy
(Japan), and those tendencies are likely to increase. A firm
hand on the spigot reduces these dangers.
Note that the critical issue is control, not access. US policies
towards the Middle East were the same when it was a net
exporter of oil, and remain the same today when US
intelligence projects that the US itself will rely on more stable
Atlantic Basin resources. Policies would be likely to be about
the same if the US were to switch to renewable energy. The
need to control the "stupendous source of strategic power" and
to gain "profits beyond the dreams of avarice" would remain.
Jockeying over Central Asia and pipeline routes reflects
similar concerns.
There are many other illustrations of the same lack of concern
of planners about terror. Bush voters, whether they knew it or
not, were voting for a likely increase in the threat of terror,
which could be awesome: it was understood well before 9-11
that sooner or later the Jihadists organized by the CIA and its
associates in the 1980s are likely to gain access to WMDs,
with horrendous consequences. And even these frightening
prospects are being consciously extended by the
transformation of the military, which, apart from increasing
the threat of "ultimate doom" by accidental nuclear war, is
compelling Russia to move nuclear missiles over its huge and
mostly unprotected territory to counter US military threats -
including the threat of instant annihilation that is a core part of
the "ownership of space"for offensive military purposes
announced by the Bush administration along with its National
Security Strategy in late 2002, significantly extending Clinton
programs that were more than hazardous enough, and had
already immobilized the UN Disarmament Committee.
As for "moral values," we learn what we need to know about
them from the business press the day after the election,
reporting the "euphoria" in board rooms - not because CEOs
oppose gay marriage. And from the unconcealed efforts to
transfer to future generations the costs of the dedicated service
of Bush planners to privilege and wealth: fiscal and
environmental costs, among others, not to speak of the threat
of "ultimate doom." That aside, it means little to say that
people vote on the basis of "moral values." The question is
what they mean by the phrase. The limited indications are of
some interest. In some polls, "when the voters were asked to
choose the most urgent moral crisis facing the country, 33
percent cited `greed and materialism,' 31 percent selected
`poverty and economic justice,' 16 percent named abortion,
and 12 percent selected gay marriage" (Pax Christi). In others,
"when surveyed voters were asked to list the moral issue that
most affected their vote, the Iraq war placed first at 42
percent, while 13 percent named abortion and 9 percent
named gay marriage" (Zogby). Whatever voters meant, it
could hardly have been the operative moral values of the
administration, celebrated by the business press.
I won't go through the details here, but a careful look
indicates that much the same appears to be true for Kerry
voters who thought they were calling for serious attention to
the economy, health, and their other concerns. As in the fake
markets constructed by the PR industry, so also in the fake
democracy they run, the public is hardly more than an
irrelevant onlooker, apart from the appeal of carefully
constructed images that have only the vaguest resemblance to
reality.
Let's turn to more serious evidence about public opinion: the
studies I mentioned earlier that were released shortly before
the elections by some of the most respected and reliable
institutions that regularly monitor public opinion. Here are a
few of the results (CCFR):
A large majority of the public believe that the US should
accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court and
the World Court, sign the Kyoto protocols, allow the UN to
take the lead in international crises, and rely on diplomatic
and economic measures more than military ones in the "war
on terror." Similar majorities believe the US should resort to
force only if there is "strong evidence that the country is in
imminent danger of being attacked," thus rejecting the
bipartisan consensus on "pre-emptive war" and adopting a
rather conventional interpretation of the UN Charter. A
majority even favor giving up the Security Council veto,
hence following the UN lead even if it is not the preference of
US state managers. When official administration moderate
Colin Powell is quoted in the press as saying that Bush "has
won a mandate from the American people to continue
pursuing his `aggressive' foreign policy," he is relying on the
conventional assumption that popular opinion is irrelevant to
policy choices by those in charge.
It is instructive to look more closely into popular attitudes on
the war in Iraq, in the light of the general opposition to the
"pre-emptive war" doctrines of the bipartisan consensus. On
the eve of the 2004 elections, "three quarters of Americans say
that the US should not have gone to war if Iraq did not have
WMD or was not providing support to al Qaeda, while nearly
half still say the war was the right decision" (Stephen Kull,
reporting the PIPA study he directs). But this is not a
contradiction, Kull points out. Despite the quasi-official Kay
and Duelfer reports undermining the claims, the decision to go
to war "is sustained by persisting beliefs among half of
Americans that Iraq provided substantial support to al Qaeda,
and had WMD, or at least a major WMD program," and thus
see the invasion as defense against an imminent severe threat.
Much earlier PIPA studies had shown that a large majority
believe that the UN, not the US, should take the lead in
matters of security, reconstruction, and political transition in
Iraq.
Last March, Spanish voters were bitterly condemned for
appeasing terror when they voted out of office the government
that had gone to war over the objections of about 90% of the
population, taking its orders from Crawford Texas, and
winning plaudits for its leadership in the "New Europe" that is
the hope of democracy. Few if any commentators noted that
Spanish voters last March were taking about the same position
as the large majority of Americans: voting for removing
Spanish troops unless they were under UN direction. The
major differences between the two countries are that in Spain,
public opinion was known, while here it takes an individual
research project to discover it; and in Spain the issue came to
a vote, almost unimaginable in the deteriorating formal
democracy here.
These results indicate that activists have not done their job
effectively.
Turning to other areas, overwhelming majorities of the public
favor expansion of domestic programs: primarily health care
(80%), but also aid to education and Social Security. Similar
results have long been found in these studies (CCFR). Other
mainstream polls report that 80% favor guaranteed health care
even if it would raise taxes - in reality, a national health care
system would probably reduce expenses considerably,
avoiding the heavy costs of bureaucracy, supervision,
paperwork, and so on, some of the factors that render the US
privatized system the most inefficient in the industrial world.
Public opinion has been similar for a long time, with numbers
varying depending on how questions are asked. The facts are
sometimes discussed in the press, with public preferences
noted but dismissed as "politically impossible." That
happened again on the eve of the 2004 elections. A few days
before (Oct. 31), the NY Times reported that "there is so little
political support for government intervention in the health
care market in the United States that Senator John Kerry took
pains in a recent presidential debate to say that his plan for
expanding access to health insurance would not create a new
government program" - what the majority want, so it appears.
But it is "politically impossible" and has "[too] little political
support," meaning that the insurance companies, HMOs,
pharmaceutical industries, Wall Street, etc. , are opposed.
It is notable that such views are held by people in virtual
isolation. They rarely hear them, and it is not unlikely that
respondents regard their own views as idiosyncratic. Their
preferences do not enter into the political campaigns, and only
marginally receive some reinforcement in articulate opinion in
media and journals. The same extends to other domains.
What would the results of the election have been if the
parties, either of them, had been willing to articulate people's
concerns on the issues they regard as vitally important?Or if
these issues could enter into public discussion within the
mainstream?We can only speculate about that, but we do
know that it does not happen, and that the facts are scarcely
even reported. It does not seem difficult to imagine what the
reasons might be.
I brief, we learn very little of any significance from the
elections, but we can learn a lot from the studies of public
attitudes that are kept in the shadows. Though it is natural for
doctrinal systems to try to induce pessimism, hopelessness
and despair, the real lessons are quite different. They are
encouraging and hopeful. They show that there are substantial
opportunities for education and organizing, including the
development of potential electoral alternatives. As in the past,
rights will not be granted by benevolent authorities, or won by
intermittent actions - a few large demonstrations after which
one goes home, or pushing a lever in the personalized
quadrennial extravaganzas that are depicted as "democratic
politics." As always in the past, the tasks require day-to-day
engagement to create - in part re-create - the basis for a
functioning democratic culture in which the public plays some
role in determining policies, not only in the political arena
from which it is largely excluded, but also in the crucial
economic arena, from which it is excluded in principle.
Noam Chomsky is the author of Hegemony or Survival:
America's Quest for Global Dominance (now out in
paperback from Owl/Metropolitan Books)
--
You are currently on Mha Atma's Earth Action Network email list,
option D (up to 3 emails/day). To be removed, or to switch options
(option A - 1x/week, option B - 3/wk, option C - up to 1x/day, option
D - up to 3x/day) please reply and let us know! If someone
forwarded you this email and you want to be on our list, send an
email to ean at sbcglobal.net and tell us which option you'd like.
Action is the antidote to despair. ----Joan Baez
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: http://www.islandlists.com/pipermail/mb-civic/attachments/20041211/5bf1f2af/attachment.html
More information about the Mb-civic
mailing list