[Mb-civic] Iran Diplomatic Moves

Wed Aug 11 15:12:57 PDT 2004

Michael

 I tend to believe Iran controls the 'propaganda' also with their nuclear
ambitioins, the mother of all battles will be in Iran.

Peace
Robin

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Michael Butler" <michael at michaelbutler.com>
To: "Civic" <mb-civic at islandlists.com>; "Governance"
<michael at michaelbutler.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 11, 2004 5:46 PM
Subject: [Mb-civic] Iran Diplomatic Moves

>From Reza

Eurasia Insight:
IRAN MAKES DIPLOMATIC MOVES TO COUNTER GEOPOLITICAL ENVELOPMENT
 8/10/04

Iran is making a diplomatic push to engage its northwestern neighbors,
aiming to reduce the perceived threat of geopolitical encirclement. A key
component of Iran¹s strategy concerns Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan¹s recent visit to Tehran failed to resolve several
substantial bilateral disputes. From the perspective of some Iranian
political leaders, however, the visit established a foundation for better
relations.

 Top Iranian officials sent clear signals during Erdogan¹s late July trip to
Tehran that they are eager to promote better bilateral relations. [For
background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Iranian First Vice President
Mohammad Reza Aref said Iran accorded Turkey ³special status² as Tehran
strives to improve its global diplomatic position. Meanwhile, President
Mohammad Khatami said during a meeting with Erdogan that strong bilateral
relations could ³safeguard the interests of the two nations and the Islamic
world,² the official IRNA news agency reported July 29.

 ³The two states should make strides in promoting [bilateral] ties due to
the sensitive situation in the region, and they should continue on this
path,² Khatami added.

 The regional situation for Iran is indeed sensitive, with Iranian leaders
feeling geopolitical pressure coming from the United States. US troops are
stationed near Iran¹s eastern and western borders  in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In addition, the United States has established a high-profile strategic and
economic presence in the Caucasus nations of Azerbaijan and Georgia. At the
same time, Iran faces considerable international criticism over the
country¹s nuclear research program. [For background see the Eurasia Insight
archive].

 In the face of persistent US pressure, Iran is working to keep economic
outlets to the outside world open. On top of trying to bolster relations
with Turkey, a NATO member state and a traditionally close US ally, Iran has
also sought to strengthen ties with Azerbaijan. [See related story].

 During their talks with the visiting Erdogan, Iranian officials repeatedly
emphasized a desire to rapidly expand trade  aiming for a total volume of
$5 billion in 2004. Discussions focused on several contentious issues
including Turkey¹s desire to revise a $30-billion gas export agreement and
a dispute over a construction contract that has kept Tehran¹s new airport
closed. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The two sides also
focused on a $3 billion mobile phone deal, in which a Turkish company would
build Iran¹s first privately owned system. Agreement on all three issues
proved elusive, in part due to opposition from vested interests in Iran.

 Iranian ultraconservatives attacked the potential mobile phone deal and
airport deals as unpatriotic in the Iranian media. They also cited security
concerns. But behind such protestations lay personal economic interest,
political observers in Tehran say. For example, Iran¹s Revolutionary Guards
Corps, which acts as the Islamic republic¹s enforcer of Islamic orthodoxy,
has kept Imam Khomeini airport closed, reportedly because guard commanders
want a company in which they have an interest to operate the facility,
rather than the Turkish concern that won the tender.

 The Iranian press, rather than explore domestically rooted obstacles to
agreement, suggested that Erdogan¹s insistence on a price reduction for
Iranian gas exports to Turkey blocked any resolution of the economic issues.
Iranian negotiators felt that Tehran was already sending energy exports to
Turkey at a discounted rate, and thus refused to revise the existing price
structure. Conversely, Turkish officials felt a strong need to obtain an
Iranian price reduction, given the country¹s extended commitment to purchase
Iranian energy combined with slackening gas demand in Turkey.

 Beyond the impasse on the trade deals, Turkey and Iran signed two memos of
understanding that left Iranian officials optimistic about the future. One
memo expressed a mutual desire to improve trade relations. More significant
was a memo in which the two countries committed themselves to improved
security cooperation. Specifically, Ankara and Tehran pledged to help each
other in the fight against domestic terrorist groups  the radical Kurdish
nationalist PKK, now called Kongre-Gel, which is agitating in Turkey for a
Kurdish homeland; and the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MEK), which for more than two
decades has waged an insurgent campaign against the Islamic republic of
Iran.

 While Iranian leaders may see anti-terrorist cooperation as an opening for
better ties between Tehran and Ankara, Turkish officials and experts are
taking a more cautious approach. Many in Ankara are not yet willing to take
Tehran at its word, and are waiting for Iran to take concrete steps towards
fulfilling the commitment outlined in the security memo. Sources in Tehran
insist that Iranian authorities are already taking steps to hamper PKK
activities, especially in areas along the Iran-Iraq border. A major
incentive for Iran to cooperate on joint anti-terrorism action is the
widespread concern in Tehran that the MEK leaders, who are finding it
increasingly difficult to maintain camps in Iraq, may attempt to move its
operational base to Turkey.

 Another encouraging sign from Iran¹s perspective was Erdogan¹s lack of
criticism on Tehran¹s nuclear research efforts. IRNA reported that Erdogan
supported the ³absolute right of every country to use nuclear energy in a
peaceful way.² Iranian officials insist that the country¹s nuclear program
is designed solely to meet civilian energy needs. International critics, led
by the United States, suspect that Iran is striving to build nuclear
weapons. [For additional Information see the Eurasia Insight archive].

 Iranian political leaders continue to send positive signals to their
Turkish counterparts. On August 9, for instance, the head of the Iranian
parliament¹s Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Technology, Ramezanali
Sadeghzadeh, hinted that the mobile phone pact will soon be sealed.
"[Iran¹s] present mobile network does not meet the current demand. That's
why signing the agreement ... is essential,² Sadeghzadeh said. ³The
Parliament will not object to it and the agreement will soon be signed."
Khatami suggested the ³complementary role² of the two nations¹ economies
would help encourage closer ties. Whether the hopes of Iranian political
leaders are fulfilled, though, appears to depend not only on Turkish
reciprocity in forging stronger bonds, but also on powerful domestic
interests inside Iran. Those interested parties, including the Revolutionary
Guards, have so far acted more as impediments than facilitators of bilateral
commerce.

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